What’s Really Happening in Venezuela?
November 29th 2007, by Lee Sustar - Socialist Worker

VENEZUELANS WILL vote December 2 on constitutional reforms proposed by President Hugo Chávez and his supporters, capping weeks of sometimes-violent protests by right-wing opposition forces, a defection by a top Chávez political ally, and mass mobilizations by Chávez supporters.

LEE SUSTAR, recently returned from Venezuela, looks at the aims of Chávez’s proposals, the response of the opposition and the shape of Venezuelan politics today.

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FOR THE U.S. mainstream media, Venezuela’s vote on constitutional reforms December 2 is simply the latest power grab in authoritarian President Hugo Chávez’s bid to crush dissent, make himself president for life and impose a state-controlled economy.

The view from the streets of the Caracas barrio of 23 de Enero, however, is very different.

A densely populated, impoverished neighborhood seldom visited by U.S. reporters, it is famous for its role in mobilizing in January 1958 to overthrow a Venezuelan military dictator on the date that gave the barrio its name.

These days, it is home to an active local branch, or battalion, of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV, according to its Spanish initials). On a rainy mid-November evening, activists gathered to distribute copies of the proposed reform by going door to door.

What else to read

Lee Sustar’s article “Where is Venezuela going?” in the July-August 2007 issue of the International Socialist Review is an extensive and in-depth look at Hugo Chávez and the meaning of 21st century socialism.

The best source in English for current news and analysis of Venezuela is the Venezuelanalysis.com Web site. Readers of Spanish should visit Aporrea.org, the widely read, frequently updated and most important Web site of the Venezuelan left.

Changing Venezuela: The History and Policies of the Chávez Government, a book by Gregory Wilpert, editor of the Venezuelanalysis.com Web site, looks at politics and policy in the debate over socialism. Another very useful book is Venezuelan Politics in the Chávez Era: Class, Polarization and Conflict, edited by Daniel Hellinger and Steve Ellner.


Of the 30 or so people who turned out--all but four of them women--just two had prior political experience in Chávez’s original political party, the Fifth Republic Movement (MVR). Only one--Rosaida Hernández--is an experienced politico, having served as a functionary of the Fifth Republic Movement and won election to Caracas’ municipal council.

More typical was Iraima Díaz, a neighborhood resident in her 30s who had long supported Chávez and benefited from his government’s social programs, but hadn’t been politically active. “I got involved to solve the problems of my community,” she said.

Another activist, Lúz Estella, a social worker whose father lives in the area, also became active recently, fed up with the opposition media and wanting to get involved.

Now Díaz and Estella find themselves members of Chávez’s own PSUV battalion--the president often turns up at the weekly Saturday meetings held at the military museum in the neighborhood.

The facility also serves as a place for enrollment in government “missions”--national social welfare programs initiated by Chávez in 2003, which evolved from offering free medical care to literacy and education programs, subsidized grocery stores and a great deal more, thanks to revenues from oil exports and some of the fastest economic growth rates in the world.

Despite its well-known member and proximity to local missions, the 23 de Enero PSUV battalion faces a challenges common to its counterparts across the country--how to mobilize the 5.7 million people who have registered for the party since it was formed earlier this year through a merger of parties of Chávez’s governing coalition.

Nevertheless, as the group, singing campaign songs, made its way through the narrow streets on steep hillsides of the barrio, people came to their windows to take copies of the reform and discuss it briefly--an elderly man alone in his small apartment; a young woman of African descent breastfeeding an infant; the proprietor of a tiny store situated in what was once a living room, with a window facing the street; a group of young men in their 20s gathered outside a small restaurant.

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THE IMPACT of Chávez’s reforms is visible on the streets of 23 de Enero and other barrios--people are better fed and better dressed.

As is often the case in Venezuela, the political direction in the barrios is the opposite Caracas’ well-off neighborhoods and the suburbs, where the upper middle class and the wealthy live in luxurious gated communities and drive Hummers and Land Rovers.

As opposition to Chávez’s reforms sharpened--first with protests by largely middle-class college students; then the defection of a longtime Chávez ally, former army chief of staff and defense minister Raúl Baduel--the mass of Chávez supporters began to mobilize.

Nevertheless, the opposition, tainted by the coup of 2002 and the subsequent lockout of oil workers by industry bosses, has been able to refresh its image.

Key to this was the student mobilization last summer over the government’s refusal to renew the broadcast license of the privately owned, opposition-controlled RCTV channel.

Wrongly portrayed in the Western media as a “closure” of a media outlet, the decision was made as the result of RCTV’s active role in supporting the coup. Nevertheless, the government’s refusal to renew the channel’s broadcast license gave Venezuela’s right the opportunity to claim the mantle of “democracy,” a theme it has continued in protests aimed at forcing a delay in the vote for constitutional reform.

Significantly, the student protests took shape as a national social movement, led mainly by middle class and wealthy students who predominate at Venezuela’s elite universities, such as the UCV in Caracas.

While portraying themselves as nonviolent in the face of allegedly armed Chavista students--two students were wounded on the UCV campus November 7--the opposition student protests have often turned violent. The U.S. media focused on the supposed gunplay of Chavista students, but it was the right-wing protesters who besieged pro-Chávez students in UCV’s law and social work schools, physically destroying both.

Still, the student protesters have carried the day politically on campus, with the opposition winning a reported 91 percent of votes in student government elections soon afterward.

The opposition got another boost when it was joined by Baduel, the former general and defense minister.

A key figure in preventing the 2002 military attempt to oust Chávez, Baduel has used the word “coup” to describe the impact of Chávez’s proposed constitutional changes.

While Baduel’s impact on the reform vote is probably limited, his turn may point to something more serious--concern among senior military brass over a constitutional reform that would reorganize and centralize the armed forces and give the president authority to promote all officers, not just top generals.

Already, Chávez has dropped a call to convert the reserves into “Bolivarian Popular Militias” to support the regular armed forces, presenting it in the constitutional reforms instead as a “National Bolivarian Militia.”

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IN ANY case, the retooled opposition presents a new challenge for activists of the “Bolivarian revolution”--named for the 19th century anti-colonial leader.

In the past, Chávez could mobilize his base among the poor on clear-cut issues--protesting the right-wing coup attempt of April 2002, voting to keep him in office in the recall election of 2004, re-electing him as president a year ago.

The constitutional reforms, however, are more complicated and controversial within the Chávez camp itself.

At issue is the balance between the creation of communal councils to enhance what Chávez calls “popular power,” and measures that would strengthen the powers of the presidency and the central state in several respects.

These include the removal of presidential term limits and lengthening the term from six to seven years; the ability to appoint an unrestricted number of secondary vice presidents; the authority to determine boundaries of proposed “communal cities” of municipalities and states; and control over the use of foreign currency reserves with no constitutional limits.

The right to recall the president still exists, but the number of signatures required to trigger a vote would increase from 20 percent to 30 percent of eligible voters.

Other constitutional measures debated on the left would give the president and National Assembly the ability to impose states of emergency in which the right to information is waived--probably a response to the private media’s complicity in the 2002 coup. The National Assembly would also gain the right to remove Supreme Court judges and election officials through a simple majority vote.

These changes hardly amount to the “Chávez dictatorship” conjured up in the mainstream media, and the Venezuelan constitution would remain more democratic in many respects than the U.S. Constitution, a relic of the 18th century.

The question, however, is whether the constitution promotes a transition to “popular power” and “socialism,” as Chávez would have it.

Essentially, the reforms reflect the contradiction at the heart of Chávez’s project--an effort to initiate revolutionary change from above.

The expansion of communal councils and creation of workers councils are seen by grassroots Chavista activists as a legitimate effort to anchor the “revolutionary process” at the grassroots.

However, the additional powers for the presidency and the reorganization of the armed forces highlight the fact that Chávez apparently sees the presidency--and the centralized state--as the guardian of the revolution.

Tellingly, it is the military, the most rigidly hierarchical institution in society, which is to protect the newly decentralized democracy, while remaining aloof from such changes internally.

Chávez’s effort to combine what he calls an “explosion of popular power” with greater centralism may reflect his military past. But if the government is able to portray itself as creating “motors” of revolutionary change, it’s because grassroots organizations, social movements and organized labor have so far failed to create sizeable organizations of their own.

While there is no doubt of Chávez’s popularity, particularly among the poor, their role thus far has been to defend Chávez from the right during the coup and lockout, and turning out for elections. The constitutional reforms, along with the creation of the PSUV at Chávez’s initiative, are intended to close the gap between these periodic mass mobilizations and the lack of day-to-day organization.

To consolidate this base, the proposed constitutional reforms offer further social gains. For example, virtually unmentioned in U.S. media accounts is the fact that the reforms would provide, for the first time, social security benefits to the 50 percent of Venezuelan workers who toil in the informal sector as street vendors, taxi drivers and the like. The workweek would be limited to 36 hours.

There are other advances as well, including the consolidation of land reform, outlawing discrimination based on gender and sexual orientation, lowering the voting age from 18 to 16, guaranteed free university education, gender parity in politics and political parties, public financing of political campaigns, recognition of Venezuelans of African descent, and more.

Critics on the right claim these measures constitute a bribe to the mass of Venezuelans--handouts in exchange for political support, a version of the traditional clientleism used Latin American populists such as Argentina’s Juan Perón.

In fact, Perón and other 20th century populists went far beyond Chávez in terms of nationalizing industries--Venezuela’s oil company, PDVSA, has been government owned since the 1970s, and the recent state takeover of the telecommunications and electrical power companies are renationalizations.

But the Chávez project aims at a more thoroughgoing social transformation than populists of the past. The aim is to build what Chávez calls “socialism of the 21st century” by trying to bypass the capitalist state with new structures and enshrining new forms of “social,” “public” and “mixed” property to promote “endogenous” economic development--that is, growth not dependent on the oil economy.

These efforts are, in turn, supposed to mesh with “communes” created by communal councils--which, under the proposed constitutional changes, will receive at least 5 percent of the national budget to manage local affairs. The text of the reform proposal explains: “The state will foment and develop different forms of production and economic units of social property, from direct or communal-controlled, to indirect or state-controlled, as well as productive economic units for social production and/or distribution.”

Moreover, the proposed reform on “popular power” also calls for the creation of councils for workers, students, farmers, craftspeople, fishermen and -women, sports participants, youth, the elderly, women, disabled people and others.

This new “geometry of power,” as Chávez calls it, is apparently designed to engineer social change while avoiding direct confrontation with big business, whose property rights are in fact safeguarded in the constitutional reforms. As Chávez himself said last summer, “We have no plan to eliminate the oligarchy, Venezuela’s bourgeoisie.”

Funds for social reforms have so far come from state oil revenues, rather than any transfer of wealth through higher taxes, and the nationalization of companies has been achieved by paying market price for stock market shares.

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THE QUESTION on the Venezuelan left is whether all this amounts to a transition to socialism, as Chávez and his supporters would have it.

For Orlando Chirino, a national coordinator of the National Union of Workers (UNT) labor federation, Chávez’s reforms herald the “Stalinization” of the state and state control of the labor movement “along the lines of the Cuban CTC labor federation,” he said in an interview.

Chirino, a key leader of the C-CURA class-struggle current of the factionalized UNT, is among the most prominent figures on the left to oppose the reforms. He made waves on the left when he granted an interview with a leading opposition newspaper and appeared on the platform with leaders of the CTV, the corrupt old trade union federation implicated in the 2002 coup.

Today Chirino, along with an oil workers union official, José Bodas, is a founder of a new group calling for an independent workers party.

Chirino’s and Bodas’ opposition to the reforms put them at odds with the majority of UNT national coordinators and organizers in C-CURA, such as Ramón Arias, general secretary of the public sector workers’ union federation, FENTRASEP. Arias is a supporter of the Marea class-struggle current of trade unionists in the PSUV, which calls for purging of employers, bureaucrats and corrupt elements in the new party.

Despite some criticisms of the centralizing aspects of the constitutional reform, including the new provisions for states of emergency, the Marea current has joined the majority of the Venezuelan left in calling for a “yes” vote to achieve social gains and defeat the opposition.

Arias and his C-CURA allies are already at loggerheads with prominent members of the PSUV, including Oswaldo Vera, a member of the National Assembly and leader of the Bolivarian Socialist Labor Front (FSBT), a faction of the UNT that also controls the ministry of labor.

The labor ministry refuses to negotiate a contract with FENTRASEP--which covers 1 million workers--because, it says, there is a dispute over union elections. As a result, many public sector employees are among the 73 percent of Venezuelan workers who earn the minimum wage--which, although the highest in Latin America, is still low in relation to the soaring prices caused by Venezuela’s rapid economic growth, to say nothing of enduring economic inequality.

Arias and other FENTRASEP leaders say that public sector workers are casualties of a larger factional struggle between the FSBT and C-CURA. This in turn is part of an internecine conflict that has prevented the wider UNT labor federation from holding a proper congress since it adopted a provisional structure at its founding event in 2003.

Now, C-CURA, the largest grouping in the UNT, is itself split over the PSUV and constitutional reform, which means organized labor’s voice is barely heard in the political debates of the day.

This sets the stage for a battle over the workers’ councils to be formed in the future, in which both factions of C-CURA expect to contend with an effort by the FSBT to exert control over the labor movement.

On the political terrain, the C-CURA activists of the Marea current inside the PSUV aim to make alliances with others on the left who have succeeded in being elected as spokespeople and delegates to the founding conference.

With the PSUV founding conference still in the future--it has been postponed repeatedly--it isn’t clear if, or how, such groupings will exist within the party, which already has a provisional disciplinary committee that reportedly expelled a prominent Chavista (the commissioners subsequently denied that this was the case).

Certainly the PSUV is a highly contradictory formation, and includes key members of the government apparatus and local elected officials who are unpopular among grassroots Chavistas. Marea’s slogan calls for a PSUV without bosses, bureaucrats and corrupt elements.

Whether the far left will be able to operate openly, be expelled or decide to leave to organize openly are open questions.

In any case, stormy weather is ahead, said Stalin Pérez Borges, a UNT national coordinator and supporter of the Marea current. Political polarization and class conflict, ameliorated in recent years by rapid economic growth, are unavoidable, he said.

“The constitutional reform marks Chávez’s consolidation of power, so the oligarchy can’t just wait for him to go,” he said. “Chávez wants to discipline and control the bourgeoisie. But they want to be in control themselves.”
Source URL: http://www.socialistworker.org/2007-2/654/654_06_Venezuela.shtml
Source URL: http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/2925
Printed: November 30th 2007

Venezuela’s Constitutional Reform: An Article-by-Article Summary
November 23rd 2007, by Gregory Wilpert – Venezuelanalysis.com

The following is an article-by-article summary of the changes being proposed to Venezuela's 1999 constitution. The summary is in no way official and should only be used as an aid in making sense of the proposed constitutional reform. The official reform text is quite long (31 pages), as it includes the full text of each to be changed article, even if only one sentence or word was changed in the article. Making out what, exactly, the changes are relative to the original 1999 constitution can thus be a sometimes time-consuming and difficult task.

Venezuelans will vote on the reform on December 2nd and will do so in two blocks. Block "A" includes President Chavez's original proposal, as amended by the National Assembly, which would change 33 articles out of the 350 articles in the constitution. Also included in block A are another 13 articles introduced by the National Assembly. Block "B" includes another 26 reform articles proposed by the National Assembly. Voters may vote "Yes" or "No" on each block.

Reform Question: "Are you in agreement with the approval of the constitutional reform project, passed by the National Assembly, with the participation of the people, and based in the initiative of President Hugo Chavez, with its respective titles, chapters, and transitional, derogative, and final dispositions, distributed in the following blocks?"



Block A

Section II. Politico-Territorial Division of the Country: President may declare special military and development zones, citizens have a new "right to the city."

Art. 11 - Allows the President to decree special military regions for the defense of the nation. Also, it would allow him to name military authorities for these regions in a case of emergency.

Art. 16 - Allows the president to decree, with permission from the National Assembly, communal cities, maritime regions, federal territories, federal municipalities, island districts, federal provinces, federal cities, and functional districts. Also the president may name and remove national government authorities for these territorial divisions (these do not, however, supplant the existing elected authorities in these regions).

Art. 18 - Provides a new right, the right to the city, which says that all citizens have the right to equal access to the city's services or benefits. Also names Caracas, the capital as the "Cradle of Simon Bolivar, the Liberator, and Queen of the Warairarepano" .

Section III. Citizen Rights and Duties: Voting age lowered to 16 years, gender parity in candidacies, creation of councils of popular power, social security fund for self-employed, reduction of workweek to 36 hours, recognition of Venezuelans of African descent, free university education, introduction of communal and social property.

Art. 64 - Lowers the minimum voting age from 18 to 16 years.

Art. 67 - Requires candidates for elected office to be set up in accordance with gender parity, reverses the prohibition against state financing of campaigns and parties, and prohibits foreign funding of political activity.

Art. 70 - Establishes that councils of popular power (of communities, workers, students, farmers, fishers, youth, women, etc.) are one of the main means for citizen participation in the government.

Art. 87 - Creates a social security fund for the self-employed, in order to guarantee them a pension, vacation pay, sick pay, etc.

Art. 90 - Reduction of the workweek from 44 hours to 36.

Art. 98 - Guarantees freedom for cultural creations, but without guaranteeing intellectual property.

Art. 100 - Recognition of Venezuelans of African descent, as part of Venezuelan culture to protect and promote (in addition to indigenous and European culture).

Art. 103 - Right to a free education expanded from high school to university.

Art. 112 - The state will promote a diversified and independent economic model, in which the interests of the community prevail over individual interests and that guarantee the social and material needs of the people. The state is no longer obliged to promote private enterprise.

Art. 113 - Monopolies are prohibited instead of merely being "not allowed." The state has the right to "reserve" the exploitation of natural resources or provision of services that are considered by the constitution or by a separate law to be strategic to the nation. Concessions granted to private parties must provide adequate benefits to the public.

Art. 115 - Introduces new forms of property, in addition to private property. The new forms are (1) public property, belonging to state bodies, (2) direct and indirect social property, belonging to the society in general, where indirect social property is administered by the state and direct is administered by particular communities, (3) collective property, which belongs to particular groups, (4) mixed property, which can be a combination of ownership of any of the previous five forms.

Section IV. Functions of the State: Creation of popular power based in direct democracy, recognition of missions for alleviating urgent needs, foreign policy to pursue a pluri-polar world, devolution of central, state, and municipal functions to the popular power, guaranteed revenues for the popular power.

Art. 136 - Creates the popular power, in addition to the municipal, state, and national powers. "The people are the depositories of sovereignty and exercise it directly via the popular power. This is not born of suffrage nor any election, but out of the condition of the human groups that are organized as the base of the population." The popular power is organized via communal councils, workers' councils, student councils, farmer councils, crafts councils, fisher councils, sports councils, youth councils, elderly councils, women's councils, disables persons' councils, and others indicated by law.

Art. 141 - The public administration is organized into traditional bureaucracies and missions, which have an ad-hoc character and are designed to address urgent needs of the population.

Art. 152 - Venezuela's foreign policy is directed towards creating a pluri-polar world, free of hegemonies of any imperialist, colonial, or neo-colonial power.

Art. 153 - Strengthening of the mandate to unify Latin America, so as to achieve what Simon Bolivar called, "A Nation of Republics."

Art. 156 - Specifies the powers of the national government, adding powers that are spelled out in earlier and in later articles in greater detail. New powers of the national government include the ordering of the territorial regime of states and municipalities, the creation and suspension of federal territories, the administration of branches of the national economy and their eventual transfer to social, collective, or mixed forms of property, and the promotion, organization, and registering of councils of the popular power.

Art. 157 - The national assembly may attribute to the bodies of the popular power, in addition to those of the federal district, the states, and the municipalities, issues that are of national government competency, so as to promote a participatory and active democracy (instead of promoting decentralization, as was originally stated here).

Art. 158 - The state will promote the active participation of the people, restoring power to the population (instead of decentralizing the state).

Art. 167 - States' incomes are increased from 20% to 25% of the national budget, where 5% is to be dedicated to the financing of each state's communal councils.

Art. 168 - Municipalities are obligated to include in their activities the participation of councils of popular power.

Art. 184 - Decentralization of power, by its transfer from state and municipal level to the communal level, will include the participation of communities in the management of public enterprises. Also, communal councils are defined as the executive arm of direct democratic citizen assemblies, which elect and at any time may revoke the mandates of the communal council members.

Art. 185 - The national government council is no longer presided over by the Vice-President, but by the President. Its members are the President, Vice-President(s), Ministers, and Governors. Participation of mayors and of civil society groups is optional now. Previously the federal governmental council (as it was called) was responsible for coordinating policies on all governmental levels. Now it is an advisory body for the formulation of the national development plan.

Section V. Organization of the State: President may name secondary vice-presidents as needed, presidential term extended and limit on reelection removed, may re-organize internal politico-territorial boundaries, and promotes all military officers.

Art. 225 - The president may designate the number of secondary vice-presidents he or she deems necessary. Previously there was only one Vice-President.

Art. 230 - Presidential term is extended from six to seven years. The two consecutive term limit on presidential reelection is removed.

Art. 236 - New presidential powers as specified in other sections of the reform are listed here, which include the ordering and management of the country's internal political boundaries, the creation and suspension of federal territories, setting the number and naming of secondary vice-presidents (in addition to the first vice-president), promote all officers of the armed forces, and administrate international reserves in coordination with the Central Bank.

Art. 251 - Adds detail to the functioning of the State Council, which advises the president on all matters.

Art. 252 - Composition of the State Council changed to include the heads of each branch of government: executive, judiciary, legislature, citizen power, and electoral power. The president may include representatives of the popular power and others as needed. Previously the council included five representatives designated by the president, one by the National Assembly, one by the judiciary, and one by the state governors.

Art. 272 - Removal of the requirement for the state to create an autonomous penitentiary system and places the entire system under the administration of a ministry instead of states and municipalities. Also, removes the option of privatizing the country's penitentiary system.

Section VI. Socio-Economic System: Weakening of the role of private enterprise in the economic system, possible better treatment of national businesses over foreign ones, no privatization any part of the national oil industry, taxation of idle agricultural land, removal of central bank autonomy.

Art. 299 - The socio-economic regimen of the country is based on socialist (among other) principles. Instead of stipulating that the state promotes development with the help of private initiative, it is to do so with community, social, and personal initiative.

Art. 300 - Rewording of how publicly owned enterprises should be created, to be regionalized and in favor of a "socialist economy", instead of "decentralized."

Art. 301 - Removal of the requirement that foreign businesses receive the same treatment as national businesses, stating that national businesses may receive better treatment.

Art. 302 - Strengthening of the state's right to exploit the country's mineral resources, especially all those related to oil and gas.

Art. 303 - Removal of the permission to privatize subsidiaries of the country's state oil industry that operate within the country.

Art. 305 - If necessary, the state may take over agricultural production in order to guarantee alimentary security and sovereignty.

Art. 307 - Strengthening of the prohibition against latifundios (large and idle landed estates) and creation of a tax on productive agricultural land that is idle. Landowners who engage in the ecological destruction of their land may be expropriated.

Art. 318 - Removal of the Central Bank's autonomy and foreign reserves to be administrated by the Central Bank together with the President.

Art. 320 - The state must defend the economic and monetary stability of the country. Removal of statements on the bank's autonomy.

Art. 321 - Removal of the requirement to set up a macro-economic stabilization fund. Instead, every year the President and the Central Bank establish the level of reserves necessary for the national economy and all "excess reserves" are assigned to a special development and investment fund.

Section VII. National Security: Armed forces to be anti-imperialist, reserves to become a militia.

Art. 328 - Armed forces of Venezuela renamed to "Bolivarian Armed Force." Specification that the military is "patriotic, popular, and anti-imperialist" at the service of the Venezuelan people and never at the service of an oligarchy or of a foreign imperial power, whose professionals are not activists in any political party (modified from the prohibition against all political activity by members of the military).

Art. 329 - Addition of the term "Bolivarian" to each of the branches of the military and renaming of the reserves to "National Bolivarian Militia."

Section VIII. Constitutional changes: Signature requirements increased for citizen-initiated referenda to modify the constitution.

Art. 341 - Increase in the signature requirement for citizen-initiated constitutional amendments from 15% to 20% of registered voters.

Art. 342 - Increase in the signature requirement for citizen-initiated constitutional reforms from 15% to 25% of registered voters.

Art. 348 - Increase in the signature requirement for citizen-initiated constitutional assembly from 15% to 30% of registered voters.



Block "B"

Section III. Citizen Rights and Duties: Non-discrimination based on sexual orientation and health, increase in signature requirements for citizen-initiated referenda, primary home protected from expropriation.

Art. 21 - Inclusion of prohibition against discrimination based on sexual orientation and on health.

Art. 71 - Increase in the signature requirement for citizen-initiated consultative referenda from 10% to 20% of registered voters.

Art. 72 - Increase in the signature requirement for citizen-initiated recall referenda from 20% to 30% of registered voters. Also, voter participation set at minimum 40% (previously no minimum was set, other than that at least as many had to vote for the recall as originally voted for the elected official).

Art. 73 - Increase in the signature requirement for citizen-initiated approbatory referenda from 15% to 30% of registered voters.

Art. 74 - Increase in the signature requirement for citizen-initiated rescinding referenda from 10% to 30% of registered voters. In the case of law decrees, increased from 5% to 30% of registered voters.

Art. 82 - Protection of primary home from confiscation due to bankruptcy or other legal proceedings.

Art. 109 - Equal voting rights for professors, students, and employees in the election of university authorities.

Section IV. Functions of the State: State and local comptrollers appointed by national Comptroller General, political divisions determined on a national instead of state level.

Art. 163 - State comptrollers are to be appointed by the national Comptroller General, not the states, following a process in which organizations of popular power nominate candidates.

Art. 164 - State powers are specified in accordance with other articles of the reform. States can no longer organize the politico-territorial division of municipalities, but only coordinate these.

Art. 173 - Political divisions within municipalities are to be determined by a national law, instead of being in the power of the municipalities. The creation of such divisions is to attend to community initiative, with the objective being the de-concentration of municipal administration.

Art. 176 - The municipal comptroller is to be appointed by the national Comptroller General, not the municipalities, following the nomination of candidates by the organizations of popular power.

Section V. State organization: Councils of popular power participate in the nomination of members of the judiciary, citizen, and electoral powers, procedures for removing members of these branches specified more explicitly.

Art. 191 - National Assembly deputies who the president has called to serve in the executive may return to the National Assembly to finish their term in office once they stop working in the executive. Previously they lost their seat in the assembly.

Art. 264 - Specifies that Supreme Court judges are to be named by a majority of the National Assembly, instead of being left to a law. Also, in addition to civil society groups related to the law profession, representatives of the popular power are to participate in the nomination process.

Art. 265 - Supreme Court judges may be removed from office by a simple majority vote of the National Assembly, instead of a two-thirds majority and an accusation by the citizen power.

Art. 266 - Adds the ability of the Supreme Court to rule on the merits of court proceedings against members of the National Electoral Council, in addition to its ability to do so in the case of all other high-level government officials.

Art. 279 - Includes representatives of popular power councils for the nomination of Attorney General, Comptroller General, and Human Rights Defender. Also, specifies that each of these may be removed by a majority of the National Assembly, instead of leaving the issue to a separate law and a ruling from the Supreme Court.

Art. 289 - Adds to the Comptroller General's powers the ability to name state and municipal comptrollers.

Art. 293 - Removes the National Electoral Council's responsibility to preside over union elections.

Art. 295 - Inclusion of representatives from the Popular Power in the nomination process of members to the National Electoral Council. Specifies that members may be chosen by a majority of National Assembly members, instead of a two-thirds majority. Election of electoral council members is supposed to be staggered now, where three are elected and then halfway through their 7-year term, the other two are to be elected.

Art. 296 - Members of the National Electoral Council may be removed by a majority of National Assembly members, without the need of a prior ruling from the Supreme Court.

Section VIII. Constitutional exceptions: Right to information no longer guaranteed during state of emergency, emergencies to last as long as the conditions that caused it.

Art. 337 - Change in states of emergency, so that the right to information is no longer protected in such instances. Also, the right to due process is removed in favor of the right to defense, to no forced disappearance, to personal integrity, to be judged by one's natural judges, and not to be condemned to over 30 years imprisonment.

Art. 338 - States of alert, emergency, and of interior or exterior commotion are no longer limited to a maximum of 180 days, but are to last as long as conditions persist that motivated the state of exception.

Art. 339 - The Supreme Court's approval for states of exception is no longer necessary, only the approval of the National Assembly.



Full Spanish text of the constitutional reform proposal
English translation of Venezuela's 1999 constitution
Source URL: http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/2889
Printed: November 30th 2007
License: Published under a Creative Commons license (by-nc-nd). See creativecommons.org for more information.