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Subject: the L word

Written By: MarthaDTox on 04/25/04 at 9:19 am

I was thinking of continuing with the L word thread .. did it take up too much space Chucky? is it worth doing??

Subject: Re: the L word

Written By: philbo on 04/25/04 at 2:47 pm

I thought it was rather fun...

Subject: Re: the L word

Written By: John Jenkins on 04/26/04 at 7:51 pm

I enjoy reading the thread... just when you think that there cannot be another outrageous law suit, you find it!

Subject: Re: the L word

Written By: MarthaDTox on 05/04/04 at 5:16 pm


er... I don't think so.......


........The plaintiffs have spent and are still spending substantial sums of money on acquiring and exploiting copyright, trade mark and other rights in connection with a pictorial representation of the business end of a shark and the accompanying slogan "JAWS." The rights of the plaintiffs are valuable and ephemeral, depending as they do on the current blood-curdling success of a book and a film whence they are derived. One device, which happily combines advertisement and exploitation of the plaintiffs' insignia, consists of the manufacture under licence of T-shirts, the present juvenile uniform, bearing on their bosoms prints of the Jaws picture and slogan. Jaws T-shirts, as they are called, display in a manner which would appeal to Tom Sawyer at once the wide knowledge and innate ferocity of the wearers. But wearers of T-shirts are notoriously fickle. At any moment, for example, their appetites, satiated with sharks, may demand a pictorial representation of our next Prime Minister or of one of Her Majesty's judges.

Subject: Re: the L word

Written By: MarthaDTox on 05/04/04 at 5:18 pm


One to show your teenage daughters .. in case they were under any illusions as to the definition and true nature of night clubs!


"it can be said that Annabel's Club provides facilities to men for dining and dancing with female partners--though not in the sense that they are made available on the premises, as is the case, I understand, in some or perhaps many night clubs, where they are known as "hostesses". Turning it round slightly, Mr. Schock's business is concerned with supplying for men facilities of female partners for the purpose, among other things, of dining and dancing with them."

Subject: Re: the L word

Written By: MarthaDTox on 05/05/04 at 3:37 am

by the way ,,, thanks for the support John and Phil... I have been v busy at work and also have had problems with viruses in my system but plan to continue with the thread now..although I also need to track down some new material  l.. have almost run out of exisiting stocks!

Subject: Re: the L word

Written By: MarthaDTox on 05/05/04 at 3:41 am

someone needs to do some serious money laundering.......



"the evidence showed the various quanities of currency obtained by Velasco was dirty and gritty  leading to the reasonable conclusion by the jury that it had been in contact with cocaine under such conditions that cociane residue adhered to it. Velasco testified that the money was always extremely dirty with a powdery substance on it. Each time he counted it with a machine a little cloud of powder arose and he got headaches"

Subject: Re: the L word

Written By: marthadtox2 on 05/06/04 at 8:57 am


(This is the same marthadtox ..just using a different computer..)

POLITICIANS  PENTHOUSE AND THE SUBWAY

PART 1 RUDY GUILIANI

SCHEINDLIN, District Judge.
Who would have dreamed that the Mayor would object to more publicity? But that is what this case is all about. Our twice-elected Mayor, whose name is in every local newspaper on a daily basis, who is featured regularly on the cover of weekly magazines, who chooses to appear in drag on a well-known national TV show, and who many believe is considering a run for higher office, objects to his name appearing on the side of City buses

Advertisement placed by magazine on sides of city buses, using mayor's first name and stating that magazine was the only good thing about city for which he had not claimed credit, did not violate New York statute prohibiting use of living person's name for trade purposes without person's written consent;

Section of city charter prohibiting public servants from engaging in business that conflicted with proper discharge of duties was not valid basis for city to request removal from city buses of advertisement, placed by magazine, which made fun of mayor's alleged penchant for taking credit for all of city's accomplishments;


PART 2 WALTER MONDALE

On April 12, 1984, Penthouse submitted a proof to Subways Advertising of a poster advertising the magazine's June issue. The poster featured a caricature of Walter Mondale by political cartoonist Uri Hofmekler. The figure, wearing a medallion labeled "ERA Yes" around his neck, was portrayed as an almost nude male "stripper", with female hands reaching up toward his unclothed thighs.

did defendants violate plaintiff's First Amendment rights by refusing to display the Penthouse advertisement within the New York City subway system on the ground that its content is "offensive"? Plaintiff claims that it was unfairly denied *1344 access to a public forum due to the political content of its mess(age, and that this selective exclusion was not justified by any compelling state interest



PART 3 LEONID BRESHNEV

Furthermore, it is undisputed that defendants accepted and displayed at least two other Penthouse advertising posters bearing political caricatures--one of Ronald Reagan and the other of Leonid Brezhnev.

advertisements by Penthouse showing "attractive women in relative stages of undress or what-have- you"  and an advertisement bearing another Hofmekler caricature of Leonid Brezhnev attired only in a "G-string." The Brezhnev poster, another Hofmekler creation, depicted the Soviet leader even more scantily clad than Walter Mondale in the poster here at issue.

But they distinguish the Mondale poster and their treatment of it on the ground that it is the only advertisement to "suggest overt sexual activity."

Subject: Re: the L word

Written By: marthadtox2 on 05/06/04 at 9:00 am

Long hair again..........

One's hair style, like one's taste for food, or one's liking for certain kinds of music, art, reading, recreation, is certainly fundamental in our constitutional scheme--a scheme designed to keep government off the backs of people. That is not to say that the police power of the state is powerless to deal with known evils. An epidemic of lice might conceivably authorize a shearing of locks. Other like crises might be imagined. But I see no way of allowing a State to set hair styles for patrons of its schools, any more than it could establish a welfare system only for men with crew cuts and women with bobbed *1045 hair. Once these lines are drawn, a serious question of equal protection of the law is raised.
This Court takes judicial notice that hairstyles have altered from time to time throughout the ages. Sampson's locks symbolically signified his virility. Many of the Founding Fathers of this country wore wigs. President Lincoln grew a beard at the suggestion of a juvenile female admirer. Chief Justice Hughes' beard furnished the model for the frieze over the portico of the Supreme Court of the United States proclaiming 'equal justice under law.' Today many of both the younger and older generations have avoided the increased cost of barbering by allowing their locks or burnsides to grow to greater lengths than when a haircut cost a quarter of a dollar. 'Whether hair styles be regarded as evidence of conformity or of individuality, they are one of the most visible examples of personality. This is what every woman has always known. And so have many men, without the aid of an anthropologist, behavioral scientist, psychiatrist, or practitioner of any of the fine arts or black arts.' Richards v. Thurston, D.C., 304 F.Supp. 449, 451.In the 1920's the fad turned to short hair:
'To conservatives, short-haired women were as much 'radicals and freaks of society' as long-haired musicians, artists, and anarchists. Some saw in bobbed hair a symbol of all the ills of the age, ranging from jazz, short skirts, sexy movies, the automobile, and prohibition to such threats as 'Freudian psychology' and the 'growing cult of the so-called free woman.' The boyish bob, followed by the shingle and bingle which shaved the nape of the neck, and then by the curly bob and spit curls, were all part of what the older generation denounced as 'Flaming Youth.'
'Preachers took to pulpits to warn that 'a bobbed woman is a disgraced woman.' In a Missouri courtroom, a mother pleading for the return of her six children who have been living with a guardian heard the oldest of them testify to the judge: 'We don't believe mother is a Christian woman. She bobs her hair.' Men divorced their wives over bobbed hair. Other males banded together with vows to give up shaving until wives agreed to let their hair grow out again. A large department store fired all bobbed haired employees and a hospital discharged bobbed haired nurses.' Severn, The Long And Short of It, p. 122 (1971).


Subject: Re: the L word

Written By: marthadtox2 on 05/06/04 at 9:14 am

A novel way to save the world......


......This defamation case concerns an article which appeared in defendant's magazine Penthouse. It was written about a "Charlene," a Miss Wyoming at the Miss America contest and about the contest. The defendants argue that the story is a spoof of the contest, ridicule, an attempt to be humorous, "black humor," a complete fantasy which could not be taken literally


The article had its setting at a Miss America contest and described Charlene, a Miss Wyoming at the contest, who was a baton twirler. The article began with a *441 description of Charlene with other contestants at a bar during the course of the contest. It quotes a conversation between Charlene and her coach, a man referred to as Corky. The story then switches to the contest as Charlene is about to perform her talent as a baton twirler. She is about to go on stage and her thoughts are described. She thinks of Wyoming and an incident there when she was with a football player from her school. It describes an act of fellatio whereby she causes him to levitate. The story returns to the Miss America stage where she goes on to perform her talent. She there performs a fellatio-like act on her baton which stops the orchestra. The act is concluded and the conversation between Charlene and her coach is described, and conversation with other contestants. She did not reach the finals but she says or thinks she has a "real talent." The third incident is then described. She is at the edge of the stage during the finals while the finalists are at center stage and the finals are under way. Charlene's thoughts are again described and these are how she would have answered the questions put to the finalists had she been one. These thoughts were that she would "save the world" with her real talent with the "entire Soviet Central Committee to prevent a Third World War? Marshall Tito? Fidel Castro?" She would be the ambassador of love and peace. The article then describes an act of fellatio with her coach at the edge of the stage while the audience was applauding the new Miss America in center stage. This fellatio causes the levitation of her coach. It is described that the television cameras were not on the new Miss America but "remained" on Charlene and her coach who was then rising into the air, and the story ends.......



Subject: Re: the L word

Written By: marthadtox2 on 05/10/04 at 10:26 am


Long hair causing problems again.......

The plaintiff was about to enter high school in September of 1969. A trombone player, he aspired to membership in the school band. Consequently, about the middle of August he reported, with other entering freshmen, to band practice.
During the preceding summer, plaintiff had let his hair grow. When he reported for band practice, the band director took exception to the length of his *955 hair. She first requested, and then ordered, that he cut it. Upon his declining to do so, the matter was brought to the attention of the defendant Chonko, the high school principal, who ordered plaintiff to cut his hair. Plaintiff again declined, whereupon he was suspended by Chonko from further band activities for ten days. He, his parents, and other the proportion, it was clear that all band of this suspension (P. Ex. 1), in accordance with state law.
With respect to the band, the evidence showed that the band members were both boys and girls. The evidence conflicted as to the proportions, ranging from 60/40 to 34/66 girls. Whatever the proportions, ranging members, regardless of sex, wore identical uniforms, consisting of trousers, jackets, and plumed garrison caps. Obviously, therefore, a boy with long hair would appear no different from a girl, so that the plaintiff's hair length could not possibly have interfered with that uniformity of appearance which defense witnesses testified was absolutely essential to prevent the entire band from being humiliated and ridiculed. Although there was evidence tending to indicate that long hair blowing about in the autumn breezed could cause problems in marching by obstructing the wearer's vision, this same evidence demonstrated that the distaff members of the band were able to cope with these problems by the use of such devices as hairpins and rubber bands, which the band director always had available. There was no evidence whatsoever that plaintiff's long hair had caused any such problems. The band director complained that audiences were distracted from proper observation of and attention to the band's performance by their efforts to distinguish the plaintiff from his female colleagues. The Court takes the liberty of doubting both the accuracy and the importance of this observation. In any event, it could not have posed a problem at any time before the plaintiff's suspension and the commencement of this action, as the band had given no public performances up to that point.

Subject: Re: the L word

Written By: marthadtox2 on 05/10/04 at 10:39 am


silly defences no 2375



“Birdsell first told the doctor he had “come on the advice of my commanding general Nathan Bedford Forrest Provisional Army Confederate States of America. He commands as Imperial Wizard of the Ku Klux Klan, and I am Imperial Wizard acting for him”
Questioning by the doctor elicited the less colourful explanation that he had been indicted for conspiring to import automobiles into Mexico and had been sent to hospital by the judge….

Birdsell asserts that he is the reincarnation of confederate General Nathan Bedford Forrest who born in 1821 was the first imperial wizard of the Ku Klux Klan. Birdsell allegedly commits his criminal activity because he is under instruction to forage “ for the cause” Birdsell allegedly believes that when he dies he will return to earth as a person names Brandt who is also a relative of General Forrest.

Birdsell relied on this assertion for an unsuccessful insanity defence as long ago as 1965……

Subject: Re: the L word

Written By: marthadtox2 on 05/11/04 at 12:05 pm

Long hair wigs and the airforce......


McCUNE, District Judge.
The plaintiff is an Airman First Class in the 112th Consolidated Aircraft Maintenance Squadron of the Pennsylvania Air National Guard.
On September 1, 1972, during an inspection he was told to get a haircut by his commanding officer because his hair did not meet the regulations set forth in the Air Force Manual. The plaintiff did not comply with the order which led to further discussion during which it was discovered that plaintiff had been wearing a wig to disguise his hair which was much longer than the hair of the wig. It was the wig which the officer had found to be unmilitary. The wig was somewhat long in the back and extended over the collar which was in violation of the manual.
The wearing of a wig to drill was also in violation of the manual of regulations unless worn to cover disfigurement or baldness and plaintiff was told that he could not attend drill in either the wig or in long hair because he was not bald or disfigured. He refused to comply with the orders.
Plaintiff's commanding officer discussed the matter with him and offered non- judicial punishment or a court martial. The plaintiff chose to face a court martial but before it could be convened plaintiff filed a complaint in equity seeking a permanent injunction against the convening of the court martial, or the taking of any punitive action against the plaintiff for violation of the Air Force Regulations dated September 3, 1971, reference AFM 35-10 relating to the wearing of wigs. Plaintiff also asks for an injunction against the defendant enjoining the exclusion of plaintiff from drill while wearing a wig and from ordering plaintiff to proceed to active duty by reason of his excessive absences. It is apparent that plaintiff has not been allowed to drill and has thus become an absentee who may be ordered to proceed to active duty.
The Air Force Manual published by the Department of the Air Force governs the Air National Guard. The Air National Guard is but an arm of the Air Force. The Federal Government pays 75% of the salaries of the men and officers of the Air National Guard. The state pays 25% of the same salaries.
The pertinent regulations from the Air Force Manual are the following:
"1-12. Dress and Appearance-Men: a. General. Each member of the Air Force must maintain high standards of dress and personal appearance. As representatives of the Air Force, it is imperative that all members present a neat and well-groomed appearance to their fellow citizens and citizens of foreign nations in countries where they are serving. Further, the need for personal cleanliness, safety, and proper wear of the uniform on the part of all members requires that certain minimum standards be established throughout the Air Force. All Air Force personnel will comply with the following standards: ....

* * *
(2) Hair. Hair will be neat, clean, trimmed, and present a groomed appearance. Hair will not touch the ears or the collar except the closely cut hair on the back of the neck. It will present a tapered appearance. Hair in front will be groomed so that it does not fall below the eyebrows and will not protrude below the band of properly worn headgear. In no case will the bulk or length of the hair interfere with the proper wear of any Air Force headgear. The acceptability of a member's hair style will be based upon the criteria in this paragraph and not upon the style in which he chooses to wear his hair.

* * *
(6) Wigs. Wigs or hair pieces will not be worn while on duty or in uniform *431 except for cosmetic reasons to cover natural baldness or physical disfiguration. If under these conditions a wig or hair piece is worn, it will conform to Air Force standards."
The Air Force contends that plaintiff is neither bald or disfigured and that when he appears for drill dressed in a wig he is out of uniform. Of course the Air Force contends that even the wig fails to meet specifications.
The plaintiff argues that he is really a civilian who devotes little of his time to the Air Force (weekend drills and summer camp) and that his occupation demands that he wear long hair. He is a member of a musical group called "Harombee" which plays so called "hard rock" for audiences of young people and argues that if he were to appear in short hair it would be thought so unusual that it would jeopardize his job. He apparently has been a musician for about 7 years and works somewhat steadily at his vocation where unusual dress and appearance is the rule rather than the exception.
He argues that wearing a long wig to his work as a musician (which is possible of course) is a hardship since a wig causes dandruff and falling hair and discomfort and he contends that he works, of course, more than he drills.

Subject: Re: the L word

Written By: marthadtox3 on 05/17/04 at 3:43 am

.(nb ..the same Martha  had to reregsiter cos of computer  problems)
.



. a cautionary tale


. J. Howard's Affair with Lady Walker
In 1982, J. Howard met "Lady" Diane Walker. Feeling the need for a drink after a day at the office, he went to a "strip joint, a titty bar" as he described it in his videotaped deposition in 1992. (Ex. 3225.) Lady Walker was one of the strippers who took everything off for J. Howard in return for his generous dollar bills. Thus, at the age of seventy-eight, he began his pursuit of Lady Walker.
J. Howard wanted Lady Walker to be his exclusive mistress and he often professed his desire and commitment to marry her if Betty died. Money was immediately bestowed upon her. The intensity of his pursuit is set forth in his letters to her.
These letters contain repetitive and aggressive protestations of his love, always coupled with a reference to money. "Jungle Money" and "Pin" are code words for money that J. Howard gave to Lady Walker. "Pin" was a regular payment made on a consistent and timely basis, "Jungle money" was a payment for her own pleasure, and "big kills" were larger sums given sporadically to Lady Walker. J. Howard also gave Lady Walker enormous amounts of jewelry, including more than $1 million purchased from Harry Winston and Nieman Marcus, the same stores at which he would subsequently buy jewelry for Vickie.
FN7. "Light of my life/ ... Now, as always you can count on/my love and devotion--our 'Jun'/money is but a small sample of my concern for my lady--..." (Ex. 630, p. HBOM 0015501.)

"... my proposal to beg you to be my mistress." (Ex. 630, p. HBOM
0015502.)

"Dear Lady--/I fear I am a nuisance--I still hope I am a beloved nuisance-- of course/I shall do what you ask 'stop calling' ... it is part of the juice of my devotion ... All of this is a far, far cry from the years gone by ... you said I could 'call you/whenever I wanted.' I fear I have abused it. If so, it is only because I love you ..." (Ex. 630, p. HBOM 0015505.)

FN8. "Dear Lady--/Perhaps true love never/runs smooth--but since I love you truly, this 'pin'/ tries to tell you I am/Your devoted man" (Ex. 630, p. HBOM, 0015479.)

FN9. "Lady love: /Jungle & Pin" (Ex. 630, p. HBOM 0015481.)

"My Lady Love--/Increased Jungle Money --/+/Pin/+/Sharom" (Ex. 630, p. HBOM 0015483.)

FN10. "Another 'pin' to go with/Big Kill" (Ex. 630, p. HBOM 0015486, H-108-1480.)


At one point, J. Howard sent Lady Walker the Koch Industries prospectus in an apparent attempt to impress her with his wealth. The front of the first page reads, "For Lady--/The Crown jewels/ J. Howard." (Ex. 630.)
This pattern of giving money, and even the terms that J. Howard used, is the same pattern that Vickie describes of J. Howard's pursuit of her a decade later. Lavish jewelry, regular payments of money, and sporadic gifts ushered these bar dancers into J. Howard's life. Apparently, it was extremely lucrative to have an affair *17 with J. Howard. J. Howard spent approximately $2 million a year on Lady Walker, which is approximately the same amount of money he spent each year on Vickie when he pursued her a decade later.
J. Howard's statement that "men in love do stupid things and I was sure guilty" is accurate. (Ex. 3225.) In J. Howard's case, it was a consistent pattern.
G. The Death of Betty Marshall and Lady Walker and the Beginning of the Lady Walker Litigation
J. Howard's affair with Lady Walker continued uninterrupted until she died suddenly as a result of complications from facelift surgery on July 9, 1991 at the age of fifty-one

Subject: Re: the L word

Written By: marthadtox2 on 05/18/04 at 2:00 pm

A cautonary tale : part 2

THE LIFE OF J. HOWARD MARSHALL, II











“J. Howard's autobiography, Done in Oil, harkens back to a nostalgic period in American history of allegedly self-made entrepreneurs who shaped our country. It recalls a time when the saying "go west young man" was the siren song for men and women of our country who left humble beginnings and crossed the rivers and plains to settle huge expanses of the nation. These ruggedly honest individuals walked the Oregon Trail, settled the Oklahoma territories, worked the California gold fields and inspired phrases like "Remember the Alamo," which needs no explanation to Americans. The myths and the reality of these individuals of character and vision survive and now form a large part of our country's history and folklore. J. Howard set himself in the context of these enterprising pioneers. Both parties have argued that to understand this case, the Court must understand who J. Howard was and who Vickie is. At the outset, the Court admits to being uncomfortable with testimony that delved so intimately into their private lives. However, after a thorough review of the bankruptcy court's record and the testimony heard by this Court, the parties are correct to emphasize the particular nature of the individuals involved. The Court will therefore set forth some insights into the myths and reality of J. Howard and Vickie.

A. Background

B. Born in 1905, J. Howard attended private schools in the northeast part of the United States, including the George School, an exclusive New England prep school, Haverford College, an elite liberal arts college, and Yale Law School, one of the nation's leading law schools, from which he graduated magna cum laude in 1931. Although he often derided his undergraduate liberal arts education, he took great pride in the legal training he received at Yale. Upon graduation, he worked as an associate in a New York firm for two years. Subsequently he returned to Yale Law School to teach and later became the Assistant Dean.

FN5. One of the subjects he taught at Yale was wills and trusts. Surely he did not realize at the time that these same subjects would take up large portions of his later life, and dominate his family's affairs for more than six years after his death.

…..

J. Howard's position with respect to the gift taxes was largely similar to his position with estate taxes--he did not want to pay them and it was his lawyers' job to figure out how to avoid them.
Sorensen, however, understood that the gifts were subject to a gift tax that had gone unpaid, and knew that this avoidance of the tax laws would cause substantial interest and penalties from the Internal Revenue Service. Sorensen eventually determined that between $12 and $14 million was given to Lady Walker without taxes being paid. In 1989, he filed amended tax returns for the years 1983-87. These eventually caused the IRS to audit J. Howard and initiate tax collection proceedings.
J. Howard repeatedly attempted to avoid taxes, and during the gift tax litigation, it was discovered that he had, in fact, found a way to use his affair with Lady Walker to his advantage. In the gift tax litigation, J. Howard took the unlikely position that his "pin" payments to Lady Walker were consulting fees. At one point, he suggested that she received a salary of $1 million per year to handle his public relation work. He not only tried to escape gift taxes this way, but it is likely that he deducted his payments to Lady Walker from his income tax returns.
His efforts to hide gifts in the guise of legitimate business operations were disclosed in the testimony of his closest advisors. Jeff Townsend testified that Finley Hilliard, J. Howard's accountant, told Townsend that J. Howard wanted to funnel funds to Lady Walker. Two corporations were formed, in part as a way for J. Howard to give Lady Walker money. Stock of Coliseum, Inc. was held in trust for her benefit and he gave her gifts of Presidio, Inc. stock. Lady Walker also served on the MPI Board of Directors. When questioned about her functions, he replied, "I guess she was a Director-- *18 never active--she never undertook anything as a Director." (Ex. 3225.)

FN11. Disputes over gift tax and inheritance tax
I. Summary
It is fair to say that J. Howard was an immensely successful businessman. He served on boards of numerous corporations and banks and became involved with a number of oil and gas ventures in Texas. J. Howard was also heavily involved in Koch Industries, as described herein. J. Howard's success earned him a ranking in Forbes Magazine as one of the 400 wealthiest men in America, and the wealthiest man in Texas. But the rating rankled J. Howard, and he claimed to dislike the publicity that it brought. What worried J. Howard more than publicity was the spotlight that it shined on his wealth. Being named as one of the richest men in the country was likely to attract the attention of the IRS.
J. Howard was a well-trained lawyer. Oddly, however, he did not appear to have much regard for the profession. He was reputed to dislike lawyers and the details of lawyering. To his mind, a legal document should never be more than one page long.

FN12. It is ironic then that his death has created the largest volume of legal filings in the history of the Southern Division of Central District of California.

19 J. Howard is also described as being irascible and demanding. Perhaps to those who knew him, those personality traits were endearing. To outsiders, he was viewed simply as impatient and hostile. His tendency to bang the table to make his point was viewed as being in command of a situation. However, the Court's view is that, at least late in his life, J. Howard's theatrics were transparent.
In addition, J. Howard's disregard for the tax codes was a pattern he followed his entire life. For ninety years, he showed nothing but contempt for the IRS and the tax codes of this country. Throughout his life he surrounded himself with excellent legal counsel who were creative in attempting to circumvent the tax codes. He ignored gift taxes until he could no longer evade the issue. He railed against the inheritance tax provisions, claiming that being forced to pay estate and income taxes was "double taxation," while at the same time he avoided paying substantial income taxes by: writing off as business expenses the gifts to his paramours Lady Walker and Vickie, whom he claimed were consultants; financing his lifestyle by taking a line of credit against his valuable stock holdings, the proceeds of which are not taxable income; and hiding and manipulating his assets in aggressive accounting gimmicks.

FN13. Surprisingly, much what J. Howard managed to do was within the confines of the law, allowing him to evade taxes by stepping through loopholes that only someone of his great wealth could afford to find.


In summary, this court is not impressed with the character of a man who had the finest private school and legal education and who consciously avoided the very taxes that millions of American families comply with every year. It is in the collection of these taxes that the government must rely on the good faith and honesty of our citizens to fund our nation's needs in time of peace and war. The fact that J. Howard could not see fit to comply with these laws, despite the great advantages that he was afforded by American society, speaks poorly of his character

Subject: Re: the L word

Written By: marthadtox2 on 05/18/04 at 2:02 pm

a cautionary tale  part 3

II. VICKIE LYNN MARSHALL





Vickie dreamed of becoming the personification of her idol, Marilyn Monroe. Both became international superstars, traveling far from home under assumed names. Norma Jean's fame thrust her into the arms of an American baseball icon and a dashing young politician, while Vickie Lynn found herself in the company of a Texas oil baron. But her notoriety never reached the same heights or longevity. Her life is best described as that of a person who was rescued by her wealthy pursuer and taught to spend money at a breathtaking pace that most Americans cannot fathom. While she detested being thought of as a gold-digger, her actions leave little doubt that money was the central facet of her relationship with J. Howard. Her appetite for money, once developed, was incessant and outlandish by everyday standards.
Vickie appeared before the Court to testify for three days. Her communication skills were poor as she frequently had trouble engaging counsel. Her illiteracy is striking. Examples are too numerous to chronicle but include writing "25.00" meaning $2,500 and "4500,00" meaning $4,500--she testified that she has trouble with zeros. In fact, she has only recently started learning to pay her own bills after years of managers and relatives managing her money. Vickie also finds herself in *20 difficult times and is being treated for depression.
But education is no guarantor of integrity and a discredited profession does not mean a person lacks truthfulness. While Vickie certainly drew a more noble image of herself than the facts bear out, her testimony on the statements made by J. Howard are credible.
A. Background
Vickie Lynn Marshall was born in Houston, Texas in 1967. Her parents divorced shortly after she was born and her father moved away. She never saw him until she looked him up after she had become Playmate of the Year. In her teens she moved with her mother to Mexia, Texas, a small town in the eastern part of the state. She completed grade school, but failed her freshman year in high school, and never progressed past an eighth grade education.
Vickie worked as a waitress and morning cook at Krispy Fried Chicken in Mexia where she met Billy Wade Smith, who was the cook at the restaurant. At the age of 17, she married Billy Smith, and at the age of 19, she gave birth to her son Daniel, her only child. The marriage ended shortly thereafter, and Vickie moved back to Houston with Daniel when he was a year old.
B. Career as a Dancer
At this point in her life, Vickie was estranged from her family. Her husband, Billy Wade Smith was not providing child support and made no effort to visit Daniel. Initially she found employment at Walmart and later as a waitress at the Red Lobster, but she could not make enough money to support herself and Daniel. Vickie testified that one day, while on the way home from work, she passed a neon sign that displayed a lady in high heels wearing a bikini. She was interested in becoming a dancer, but deferred at first when she found out it was a nude dance bar. She initially sought a job as a waitress but was quickly talked into dancing on stage. After a couple of drinks, humiliated but willing to dance, she overcame her inhibitions and continued as a dancer when she saw "all the money in her lap which paid the bills."
Vickie, however, was big-boned, and in the fashion trends of the late 1980's and early 1990's, her figure relegated her to the "B" team. Instead of working the lucrative night shifts, Vickie danced during the day, for less pay and fewer tips. But this apparent disadvantage would soon work in her favor.




III. J. HOWARD'S AND VICKIE'S TIME TOGETHER
J. Howard and Vickie began their relationship in October 1991, when they met at Gigi's in Houston, Texas. They married June 27, 1994 and their relationship continued until his death on August 4, 1995. They met when she was at the vibrant age of twenty-four, and he a sickly eighty-six year-old man. The issues of J. Howard's donative intent and Vickie's expectancy can only be understood by slowly unwinding their years together.
A. The Meeting of J. Howard and Vickie
After Lady Walker and Betty died in 1991, J. Howard entered a period of deep despondency. He appeared to his family and friends to have lost his zest for life. In 1991, J. Howard told his eldest son, J. Howard, III, that "he enjoyed having pretty women on his arm when he entered the River Oaks Country Club in Houston and that a great light had gone out of his life."
In October 1991, Vickie was dancing at Gigi's, a Houston strip club. Dan Manning *21 was J. Howard's driver who frequented Gigi's and had seen Vickie dance. Manning and J. Howard had talked about going to a burlesque bar and in October, Manning drove his boss to Gigi's to cheer him up. Because of J. Howard's age and physical condition, he did not go out at night, and thus they arrived during the day-shift, when Vickie worked. Manning approached Vickie and asked her to dance for J. Howard. According to Vickie, when she saw J. Howard, "he looked terrible, he looked like he had lost his will to live." While Vickie danced, J. Howard tried to grab her breasts. Thus began J. Howard's aggressive pursuit of Vickie's affection. He asked to her to have lunch with him the next day. A description of this lunch helps to understand the pattern that they followed for the years of courtship prior to their marriage.
B. The Courtship
J. Howard initially took Vickie to a restaurant hotel and ordered room service. He told Vickie about Betty and Lady Walker and funny stories about himself. When she became concerned about her job, he gave her an envelope with a thousand dollars in cash and told her not to go to work. The following day they had lunch at River Oaks Country Club, where once again she was given cash. On each occasion, money was given to her ranging in amounts of $1,000 to $5,000 in cash. Vickie "stopped dancing right after Howard met me that day." (Dep. of Vickie, Dec. 28, 1999, vol. 3, p. 600.) J. Howard was soon paying all of Vickie's bills. Shortly after they met, J. Howard purchased a white Toyota Celica as a gift for her after her own car had been repossessed.
She started receiving $2,000 checks twice a month. (Ex. 48.) These checks were recorded by J. Howard's assistant Eyvonne Scurlock for consulting, just as his previous "pins" to Lady Walker had been. Summaries prepared by Scurlock were then sent to J. Howard's accountant for tax purposes and 1099 Tax forms for Vickie were prepared. (AP 11462, Dep. of Eyvonne Scurlock, August 27, 1999. pp. 72, 576-577.) These $2,000 checks increased over time to $2,750.
Within a week of their meeting, J. Howard told Vickie that he was going to marry her. He had been re-invigorated by Vickie. While he had fallen into a state of deep despair after the deaths of Lady Walker and Betty, his relationship with Vickie brought him back to life. He called her "the light of his life." He told his attorney Harvey Sorensen numerous times that he wanted to marry Vickie.
According to Vickie, J. Howard asked her to marry him "tons of times." She contends that the proposals were usually accompanied by the same assurance that once they were married, she would have half of everything he had. His proposals occurred frequently, and are confirmed by numerous friends, employees and professional associates. He started buying her rings that increased in size and value. When he gave her rings, there was always the same conversation about marriage. "It seemed like every time he would buy me a bigger and bigger ring and he would ask me over and over and over and he was very pushy. He really loved me. He just really wanted to marry me." (Dep. of Vickie, December 28, 1999, p. 642.) During J. Howard's courtship of Vickie, he purchased at least three large engagement rings as well as numerous smaller rings. On each occasion, the giving of these rings was accompanied by the same incessant matrimonial proposals.
J. Howard's aggressive pursuit is illustrated by one instance where he purchased jewelry for Vickie from Nieman Marcus. On Christmas Eve 1993, David Watson, a *22 Nieman Marcus employee, delivered various pieces of jewelry to Vickie's home for her and J. Howard to review. Vickie looked at all the pieces, and commented that a particular yellow diamond ring was too expensive and should not be shown to J. Howard. When J. Howard arrived, he looked at the jewelry and commented: "this is better than the Home Shopping Network." J. Howard then asked if he had seen everything. Watson, forgetting Vickie's admonition, showed J. Howard the yellow diamond ring. When told that the price was, $107,000, J. Howard stated: "Oh, just a baquetta." J. Howard then completed the purchase. That purchase, and an earlier one by J. Howard in April 1993, were the two largest purchases in store history.
During their courtship, J. Howard made numerous other gifts to Vickie. On September 16, 1992, J. Howard purchased a ranch for Vickie in Tomball, Texas, outside of Houston (the Tomball Ranch). This ranch was purchased in the name of the J. Howard Marshall, II, Living Trust (the Living Trust), but was intended for Vickie's use and benefit. J. Howard later purchased a home on Rusington Street in Houston, which was held by the Houston Land Trust, with her as the beneficiary. J. Howard also rented the Los Angeles house that Marilyn Monroe had lived in. When the lease expired, he purchased a house on Ashdale street in the Brentwood area of Los Angeles for her. J. Howard also provided Vickie with an apartment in New York City when she spent time there. He bought her $10,000 gowns that could only be worn once because in "Hollywood you could never wear the same dress twice." Jewelry purchases from Harry Winston jewelers for Vickie exceeded $2 million. In 1992, J. Howard purchased a new Mercedes Benz for Vickie.
Vickie testified that J. Howard taught her to spend money, and that spending money was fun. She was the second of two women with little wealth and no experience whom J. Howard taught that there were no limits to the fun of spending money if they were with him.
J. Howard eventually introduced Vickie to Pierce. On one occasion in 1992, J. Howard took Vickie and Pierce to lunch at the Royal Oaks Country Club. From the outset, the relationship between Vickie and Pierce was tense. Vickie already believed that Pierce did not like her, and felt that during the entire lunch he was giving her "mean looks." According to Vickie, when J. Howard went to the restroom, Pierce told her "don't let J. Howard buy you anything else."
J. Howard nevertheless repeatedly proposed to Vickie. She had just started taking voice and modeling lessons when she met J. Howard, and although she was flattered by these proposals, she wanted to have a career first. Vickie put off J. Howard almost three years before she finally accepted his proposals.
Shortly after they met, Vickie saw an ad in the newspaper to audition for Playboy Magazine. After meeting with a scout, Vickie was quickly hired and two weeks later was doing a test shoot in California. In March 1992, Vickie made her Playboy debut, appearing on the cover. In May 1992, she was named Playboy Playmate of the Month.
Vickie was contacted by Guess Jeans to be part of its national advertising campaign. She became their top spokes-model for a one-year period from 1993-94. During this time, she appeared in numerous other magazines and in 1993 was named the Playboy Playmate of the Year. Vickie had achieved the level of international sex symbol, and was one of the most recognized print models in the world. Her stardom *23 only encouraged J. Howard to pursue her with a newfound vigor.
In Spring 1994, Vickie was on tour for Guess Jeans in Singapore. While there, she and the Guess Jeans entourage were mobbed by fans. The incident scared her, and the remainder of the tour stops in Japan and the Philippines were cancelled. When she returned home to Houston, J. Howard once again proposed to her. J. Howard repeated that she was the woman who had saved his life, that he would take care of her and her son, and that she would have half of everything he had. This time, Vickie accepted.
Vickie testified that his money was a factor in her decision to marry J. Howard, but contends that she would have married him anyway. Vickie sought security for her and her son, and what he might lack in youth, vigor, and looks, J. Howard made up for with his great wealth. Although she has often been portrayed to the Court as a gold-digger and predator, she did hold a certain regard for J. Howard, and was willing to compromise her prime modeling years for someone who showered her with gifts and offered financial security.


C. The Marriage of J. Howard and Vickie
J. Howard and Vickie were married on June 27, 1994 at the White Dove Wedding Chapel in Houston, Texas. Although numerous prenuptial agreements had been prepared, beginning as early as 1992, none were signed, nor was any such agreement ever discussed with Vickie.
The wedding was not widely announced, and Pierce did not learn of the wedding until after it occurred. Only a few close confidantes attended, including J. Howard's assistant Eyvonne Scurlock, his new driver Arnold Wyche, his nurse Charlotte Fade, and Vickie's aunt and uncle, Elaine and Melvin Tabers. Henry Schlesinger, one of the MPI executives was invited, but did not attend.
The night of the marriage, Vickie flew to New York on an assignment, leaving J. Howard in Texas. On July 6, 1994, J. Howard left for California to visit his new wife.
During their marriage, J. Howard continued to give extravagant gifts to Vickie. J. Howard also considered adopting Vickie's son Daniel. One of J. Howard's lawyers, Jeff Townsend began seriously investigating the issue. He contacted counsel in California about possible adoption proceedings and traveled to California to meet with attorney Lawrence Leone. (Ex. 143.) The adoption, however, never took place because Townsend determined that he would not be able to obtain consent from Daniel's natural father, Billy Wade Smith. The steps taken to begin an adoption proceeding demonstrate that J. Howard was prepared to undertake a greater commitment to Vickie and her son, not only during his lifetime, but long afterward.
Vickie and J. Howard also tried to have children of their own. Initially, they tried to have children in what Vickie described as "the normal way." When that did not work, J. Howard went to a fertility doctor to seek advice and treatment.




Subject: Re: the L word

Written By: marthadtox3 on 05/20/04 at 12:21 am

a comment on the English class system........



"By their writ the plaintiff executors claimed an order that a 99-year lease of shooting rights over the Swythamley estate which the late Sir Philip Brocklehurst had granted to the defendant should be set aside:
"as having been entered into by... the... deceased as a result of the undue influence of the defendant exerted whilst in a position of confidence and trust."
At the very beginning of his judgment Blackett-Ord V.-C. announced his finding about the defendant's conduct. He did so in these terms:
"I say at once that I find no evidence of any consciously improper conduct on the part of Mr. Roberts. He did a great deal for Sir Philip in his latter years, and I am satisfied that when he obtained the confidence of Sir Philip to the extent which he did, he only accepted from him benefits which he genuinely thought Sir Philip intended him to have. The plaintiffs, through their counsel, have expressly disclaimed any suggestion that Mr. Roberts improperly influenced Sir Philip."
Many common lawyers would expect that finding to result in judgment for the defendant. Yet the court ordered the lease to be set aside for the reason alleged in the writ. I found this an unexpected result.
Mr. Francis, on behalf of the plaintiffs, submitted that it was a result that would have been expected in a court of equity once the evidence established, as he said it did, a relationship of confidence and trust between Sir Philip and the defendant. The reason for this was that there was no evidence to prove that before executing the lease Sir Philip had had any independent advice. The lack of such evidence, as a matter of law, submitted Mr. Francis, made it impossible for the defendant to rely upon the facts (as the Vice-Chancellor found them) that his conduct towards Sir Philip had not been improper and that he had not intended to influence him in any improper way. For my part I find such a rule of law, if there be one, unattractive; but if that be the law, I must apply it.
I have no difficulty in accepting that a plaintiff's evidence may prove the existence of a relationship resulting in large gifts being made which calls for an explanation from a defendant recipient. If no explanation is given, or if given, is unsatisfactory, a court should infer that the gifts were obtained by the exercise of undue influence. Some common lawyers refer to this as the shifting of the evidential burden of proof. In the courts of equity it has been the practice to say that such situations raise a presumption of undue influence which a defendant recipient has to rebut. What I found a difficult concept was the notion that such a presumption could only be rebutted by one kind of evidence.
In my judgment the issues in this case are these: did the plaintiffs prove that there existed between Sir Philip and the defendant such a confidence as to enable the defendant to exercise influence over him? If yes, did the defendant prove that the granting of the lease by Sir Philip came about by a free and independent exercise of his will?
In the last months of his life Sir Philip came to depend heavily upon the defendant for easing the burden of day to day living. The attraction *34 for Sir Philip was that the defendant would do whatever he was told to do. But the defendant was no obsequious crony. Still less was he a dominating factotum. Each knew his place in the world. Sir Philip's was much higher than the defendant's. Sir Philip was the son of a Victorian squire and had himself become the Squire of Swythamley Park when he was 17. He was autocratic and self-willed. The defendant had been a butcher's apprentice and a lorry driver. When he first met Sir Philip in the mid 1960's he was running a small garage. What brought them together was their common interest in shooting. They liked each other; but from the beginning of their friendship until Sir Philip's death the defendant never crossed the social gap which lay between them. Sir Philip addressed him, and referred to him, as John, but the defendant always addressed, and referred to the other as Sir Philip. In cross-examination, the defendant, who had been a rating in the Royal Navy for 18 months during the second world war, in a few words set the scene:
"I never had any disagreement with Sir Philip all the time I knew him, but it did not alter the fact that he had still got that army atmosphere behind him."
That atmosphere had been acquired by service as an officer in the Life Guards and the Arab Legion - a daunting combination for a former rating. One witness, Mr. Fane Murray, who seems to have had a keen appreciation of the niceties of the social gradations in English life, described the defendant's attitude towards Sir Philip as "slightly subservient in the nicest possible way." That is what I would have expected it to be. There are details in the evidence which for me illuminate the relationship. Until Lady Brocklehurst left in 1972 the defendant was never,invited into the house. After she had left he did go in but by the back door. He only went in when he was asked to call or had a specific reason for doing so. He was never invited to stay. He helped Sir Philip in most intimate ways, as, for example, when accidents happened with his colostomy equipment; but Sir Philip never discussed his financial and family affairs with him, although he was not reluctant to do so with his friend and neighbour, Mrs. Knight, whom he regarded as a social equal.
In the last two years of his life, Sir Philip probably was in need of some protection from himself, mostly because of his impulsive generosity. His gift of £5,000 to his bank manager is an example of such generosity. Strange though such behaviour was, it was not wholly irrational. He was a wealthy man without a male heir. His wife had left him and anyway she was wealthy in her own right. Both his daughters were married and he had settled money on them years before. His sister was about the same age as he was and not in need. His only male blood relation was a great-nephew with whom he had had little contact and to whom he was not attracted. After his wife left him he often thought and talked, but not to the defendant, about what he should do with his wealth. He had difficulty in deciding. He did not hold the opinion, as many of his social kind and generation might have done, that to break up, or impoverish, an estate such as Swythamley would be an act of treachery to his family, his class and even his country. He saw his estate as an asset which he could dispose of as he liked. He had barred the entail. Swythamley had *35 not been in his family all that long. He was a grandchild of the Industrial Revolution. His parents' marriage had brought together two of the leading families in the cotton and silk trades. He clearly lacked that desire to maintain intact a family estate which is often to be found among families which have been landowning for generations. Our law in the past has done little to encourage (but much to discourage) families to keep a grip on estates and in this century legislation has made it difficult for them to do so. A disposition of rights over an estate may be most stupid estate management; but if it is good in law I can see no reason why the courts should interfere. It is no part of our function to maintain the integrity and value of landed estates any more than it is to curb generosity amounting to folly"

Subject: Re: the L word

Written By: marthadtox3 on 05/23/04 at 1:02 am

Another cautionary tale... but your Honour she said she was on the pill.....

so now you know what biofeedback therapy is......




From April, 1983 to August 10, 1983, defendant treated plaintiff by using biofeedback therapy, hypnotherapy, and psychotherapy. During the course of his treatment of plaintiff, defendant began to make sexual advances toward plaintiff. Defendant planned a trip to Alaska and asked plaintiff to accompany him as part of her therapy. During the trip defendant and plaintiff began to have sexual relations.

WHEN A CHILD IS CONCEIVED AS A RESULT OF A TORTIOUS SEXUAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A THERAPIST AND HIS CLIENT, MAY THE CLIENT RECOVER FROM THE THERAPIST THE FINANCIAL EXPENSE OF RAISING THE CHILD?

To assess damages against the mother for false representations about birth control would have the practical effect of reducing or eliminating support from the father by way of offset. Erasing much or all of the father's financial support, to the detriment of the child, is clearly against public policy and the statutory mandate.

we think it is not sound policy to allow one parent to sue the other over *1008 the wrongful birth of their child. Using the child as a damage element in a tortious claim of one parent against the other could seldom, if ever, result in benefit to a child. Such a lawsuit would indeed be strong evidence of parental rejection, which could only be emotionally detrimental to the child.
We agree with these policies, and hold that in the circumstances presented by this record, P may not recover as damages from Moore the costs of raising her son. Again, assuming M committed professional malpractice in seducing Poor, Poor is entitled to recover tort damages for any injury to Poor proximately resulting from Moore's conduct. Thus, Poor may recover medical expenses, pain and suffering, and lost wages resulting from the tort. Poor may also recover any damages which a client under like circumstances who did not become pregnant, could recover, including damages for emotional distress


Subject: Re: the L word

Written By: marthadtox3 on 05/26/04 at 2:19 am

a blast from the past for conspiracy buffs....


A. The Gemstone Plan
In the early morning hours of June 17, 1972, roughly four and a half months before the presidential election, police discovered five men inside the DNC offices carrying electronic equipment, cameras, and large sums of cash. These were no ordinary burglars. They were operating as part of a larger CRP intelligence gathering plan code-named Gemstone, and they had been in the DNC offices once before, in late May. Their mission this time was to fix a defective bugging device placed during the prior entry on the telephone of the DNC chairman; these orders had come after high officials at CRP expressed dissatisfaction with the information theretofore produced by the expensive Gemstone. Tr. 2649, 4143-4147, 4519-4521.
FN9. The burglars were James McCord, Bernard Barker, Eugenio Martinez, Virgilio Gonzalez, and Frank Sturgis. Tr. 4143. They, along with E. Howard Hunt, Jr. and G. Gordon Liddy, were convicted of burglary, conspiracy, and unlawful endeavor to intercept oral and wire communications. All but McCord and Liddy were convicted on pleas of guilty. See United States v. Liddy, 166 U.S.App.D.C. 95, 509 F.2d 428 (1974).


Gemstone was the brainchild of G. Gordon Liddy, CRP's general counsel, who had been hired in late 1971 with the expectation that he would develop plans for gathering political intelligence and for countering demonstrations. Tr. 2625- 2628, 4507. That expectation was abundantly fulfilled. Collaborating with E. Howard Hunt, Jr., a former CIA agent whom Liddy knew well from previous ventures undertaken at White House behest, Liddy went to work on his assignment. In two meetings held during January and February 1972 he presented his initial Gemstone plan and budget to Mitchell, at that time Attorney General but even then the functional head of the Nixon re-election effort. These meetings were attended by Jeb Stuart Magruder, Deputy Director of CRP and later an important Government witness, and John W. Dean, III, counsel to the President and eventually the Government's prime witness at trial. At these first meetings Liddy failed to win approval. Mitchell indicating that the original million-dollar budget had to be scaled down. Tr. 2628-2634, 4507-4513. By March 30, however, Liddy had pared his budget to $250,000, and Mitchell had resigned his duties as Attorney General to become head of CRP in title as well as function. On that date, in Key *53 **276 Biscayne, Florida, Magruder obtained Mitchell's approval for Gemstone in a meeting attended only by Mitchell, Magruder, and Fred LaRue, a close personal friend to Mitchell then serving as a top campaign aide. Tr. 3276-3277, 4514- 4517, 4638-4639.
FN10. Tr. 7662-7664. Hunt still maintained an office in the Executive Office Building next door to the White House.

FN11. Both Dean and Magruder were convicted of conspiracy on pleas of guilty entered before the instant trial began. Both served prison terms for their roles in the cover-up. Tr. 3330-3331, 4503.

FN12. These early proposals included plans to kidnap demonstration leaders and to plant call girls with Democratic officials. Tr. 4117-4120.

FN13. LaRue, like Dean and Magruder, became an important Government witness. He too entered a plea of guilty to conspiracy and was awaiting sentencing at the time of this trial. Tr. 6733-6734, 6743-6746.


Magruder, who had once served on Haldeman's staff, was keeping the White House informed of campaign developments, including Gemstone plans and operations, by regularly transmitting documents and information on to Strachan, Haldeman's assistant. Tr. 4511-4513, 4518, 6612-6613. Haldeman himself had learned directly about an early version of the Liddy plan when Dean reported to him shortly after the February meeting. Tr. 2635-2636.
B. The Early Stages of the Conspiracy
The five burglars arrested inside the DNC gave aliases to the D.C. police, but within hours of the break-in Liddy, who had been monitoring the operation from a safe vantage point in a nearby building, reported the capture to CRP's highest officials, then in California. He told them that one of the captured burglars was James McCord, on CRP's payroll as chief of security. In an apparent effort to avoid the appearance of any link between CRP and the burglars, Mitchell, Mardian, LaRue, and Magruder met and decided to contact the new Attorney General, Richard Kleindienst, urging him to have McCord released from jail before the police penetrated his alias. Mardian placed the call, but ultimately sent Liddy to find the Attorney General when Kleindienst could not be reached directly. Tr. 4530-4536, 6563-6565. This fitful effort foundered, however, on Kleindienst's insistence that the burglars receive no special treatment. If Mitchell wanted to talk to him about it, Kleindienst said, Mitchell should contact him directly. Tr. 5898-5909.
Aware that McCord's true identity would come to light. Mardian, Magruder, and LaRue the next day worked on a press release that would deny any CRP tie to the break-in. Tr. 4537-4540, 6565-6569. It suggested instead that McCord might have been working for clients of his private security firm. Haldeman, contacted by long-distance telephone, approved the statement and urged that the release issue as soon as possible, even though Magruder had already informed him that the break-in was "Liddy's operation." Tr. 4542-4544. The release appeared on June 18 under Mitchell's name and with his approval. J.A. 912.
Meanwhile, in Washington, White House and CRP files were being cleansed of sensitive materials relating to Gemstone. Strachan performed this function at the White House, under orders from Haldeman to remove anything embarrassing. Among the items destroyed were DNC wiretap reports and a memorandum from Haldeman to Magruder urging that the intelligence operation shift from Senator Muskie to Senator McGovern, the emerging Democratic front-runner. Tr. 2651- 2653, 4547-4548. Magruder immediately ordered removal of all Gemstone materials from the files at CRP; he took them to his home upon his return from California on June 19. At a meeting that night, attended by Mitchell, Magruder, LaRue, Dean, and possibly Mardian, Magruder asked Mitchell what to do with the papers. Mitchell suggested that he "have a fire," and he did destroying the Gemstone documents in his home fireplace. Tr. 4540-4550, 4823, 6570-6573.

Subject: Re: the L word

Written By: marthadtox3 on 05/26/04 at 5:12 pm

Trouble in the orchestra pit.......

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
BURKHART
v.
NORTH AMERICAN CO.
Feb. 12, 1906.

Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County.
Action by Harry L. Burkhart against the North American Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.
The alleged libelous article was as follows: 'Mrs. Carter Victor in War on Orchestra. 'Stubborn Musicians Nearly Prevented Performance of 'Du Barry' at the Broad.
'Discords Enraged Her.
'Row Behind Scenes Ends in Ejectment of Oboe, Bassoon and Four Brasses.
'Those persons who were in the audience at the Broad Street Theatre last Tuesday night will not know, until they read this, how near they came to being turned away without seeing the performance of 'Du Barry.'
'For a full half-hour before the curtain rose there was a lively time behind the scenes, with David Belasco and Mrs. Carter as the contestants on the one side and representatives of Nixon & Zimmerman on the other. In the end the Belasco-Carter forces were victorious.
'It was all about the Broad Street Theatre Orchestra. When the 'Du Barry' engagement began that organization was enlarged from eleven to seventeen pieces. Mr. Belasco paying more than half of the additional expense.
'Before the first performance there was ended Mrs. Carter complained that the discords of the orchestra had almost set her frantic, and she sent for Arthur Pell, her musical director, and instructed him to 'cut out' the extra pieces, which consisted of four brasses, an oboe and a bassoon.
'But they Only Laughed.
'Mr. Pell obediently informed the brasses, the oboe and the bassoon to this effect, but to his amazement they discordantly laughed at him, saying that they had been engaged by Mr. Kearney, the leader of the Chestnut Street Theatre Orchestra, who employes all musicians for the Nixon & Zimmerman theatres, and that only from him would they take their dismissal.
'The matter was then allowed to rest until Mr. Belasco should return from Atlantic City, Mrs. Carter vowing in the meantime that the frightful noises of those six 'extras' were rapidly ruining her nervous system.
'Mr. Belasco arrived last Monday night, listened to a few bars of the overture and fled with his fingers in his ears. When quiet had been restored he returned and notified the Nixon & Zimmerman representatives that unless the six wind compressors were discharged before the next night there would be no performance of 'Du Barry.'
'When the next evening arrived and Director Pell took his seat the six were still there, and when he ordered them out they again turned up their noses at him and asked him who he was, anyway; they didn't know him; they had been employed by Mr. Kearney, etc.
'Then Mr. Belasco and Mrs. Carter took action. They declared with unmistakable emphasis, that the curtain would not rise until the objectional sextette had been evicted, and Mrs. Carter went so far as to produce her street costume, preparatory to leaving the theatre.
'Called Off by Kearney.
'At this interesting point the Nixon & Zimmerman authorities, represented by one Love, who felt anything but his name for the Belasco-Carter interests, called up Kearney over the 'phone and had Kearney call off the objectional six.
'The curtain then arose and the performance proceeded, 'with just eleven- seventeenths of the previous amount of discord,' as one of the company phrased it.
'Apropos of the incident it is said, on good authority, that when the Rogers Brothers played at the Chestnut Street Theatre they found the orchestra there so little to their liking that they had it exchanged for that of the Broad Street Theatre, but when they got the latter it was so much worse that they asked and obtained the return of the first aggregation.'
At the trial the court excluded under objection and exception evidence of the plaintiff's reputation as a musician.
Defendant presented the following points: '(2) If the jury believe that the article published does not designate or identify the plaintiff, the verdict must be for defendant. Answer: That point I affirm. (3) If the article is substantially true as published, there can be no verdict for plaintiff. Answer: That point I affirm. (4) If the article correctly reports the fact of the plaintiff's discharge, and does not make any reflections or allegations respecting his professional competency, your verdict should be for defendant. Answer: This point I affirm.'
Argued before MITCHELL, C. J., and FELL, BROWN, MESTREZAT, POTTER, ELKIN, and STEWART, JJ

Subject: Re: the L word

Written By: marthadtox3 on 06/02/04 at 1:32 am

The curious case of Costanza v Seinfeld

A person is seeking an enormous sum of money for claims that the New York State courts have rejected for decades. This could be the plot for an episode in a situation comedy. Instead, it is the case brought by plaintiff Michael Costanza who is suing the comedian, Jerry Seinfeld, Larry David (who was the co-creator of the television program "Seinfeld"), the National Broadcasting Company, Inc. and the production companies for $100 million. He is seeking relief for violation of New York's Civil Rights Law §§ 50 and 51, being cast in a false light, invasion of privacy and defamation.

PLAINTIFF'S CONTENTIONS
The substantive assertions of the complaint are that the defendants used the name and likeness of plaintiff Michael Costanza without his permission, that they invaded his privacy, that he was portrayed in a negative, humiliating light and that he was defamed by defendant Larry David when reports were published by a spokesman that plaintiff Michael *564 Costanza had a tenuous connection and was a "flagrant opportunist" seeking to cash in when the hyperbole of the Seinfeld program's final episode was at its peak. Plaintiff Michael Costanza asserts that the fictional character of George Costanza in the television program "Seinfeld" is based upon him. In the show, George Costanza is a long-time friend of the lead character, Jerry Seinfeld. He is constantly having problems with poor employment situations, disastrous romantic relationships, conflicts with his parents and general self-absorption.
These aspects are part of the comedic interplay with Jerry Seinfeld and the other actors that lead to the great success of the television show "Seinfeld". Plaintiff Michael Costanza points to various similarities between himself and the character **899 George Costanza to bolster his claim that his name and likeness are being appropriated. He claims that, like him, George Costanza is short, fat, bald, that he knew Jerry Seinfeld from college purportedly as the character George Costanza did and they both came from Queens. Plaintiff Michael Costanza asserts that the self-centered nature and unreliability of the character George Costanza are attributed to him and this humiliates him.


FN1. The misappropriation of comedic ideas in the context of a Seinfeld episode was the issue in Leifer v. Castle Rock Tel., New York Law Journal, July 2, 1997, p. 29, c. 2 (Sup.Ct.N.Y.Cty.1997).


Subject: Re: the L word

Written By: marthadtox3 on 06/02/04 at 1:39 am

the other Seinfeld lawsuit.....


LEIFER V. CASTLE ROCK TELEVISION, INC.

Justice Tompkins

This action involves a claim that plaintiff disclosed a story idea to defendant Carol Leifer and elements of this idea were incorporated as a subplot of an episode of the television show "Seinfeld".
Plaintiff asserts that his story idea was of a comedic scene in which there are conversations at a Korean nail salon in New York, between the manicurists in Korean and two American women who are unaware that the Korean women are discussing them. Plaintiff presented his story idea to Ms. Leifer on June 20, 1991 and sought to cast her in a lead role in his short film on the subject. She declined to appear in the proposed film and the short film was ultimately produced by plaintiff in November 1991 under the title "Rosebud." It was exhibited by plaintiff in 1992 at the Edinburgh Film Festival, six times in New York at the Magno screening room for private screenings and three times at the Laemmle Theater in June 1992 to qualify for Academy award consideration. Three years later, the Seinfeld episode that features a Korean nail salon subplot was produced and broadcast. In the Seinfeld show, the female lead, Elaine, is portrayed as suspicious and uncomfortable since she believes that she is the subject of the manicurists' conversation in Korea. Despite their denials to her in English, she is in fact the subject of various satirical remarks. Unlike the plaintiff's film "Rosebud", which has two American women unaware of the Korean manicurists' parallel conversation, in the Seinfeld episode, only one American woman is present and she is highly sensitive to the possibility that she is being criticized in a language she does not speak. Plaintiff commenced this action in February 1966.
Under New York's law concerning intellectual property, an idea must be novel and original to warrant an ownership interest, see Paul v. Haley, 183 A.D.2d 44 (2nd Dept. 1992) Iv denied 81 N.Y. 2d 707 (1993). The concept of novelty includes an element of confidentiality since an idea cannot be novel if it is publicly available, generally known or imparted under circumstances that do not restrict disclosure, see Ferber v. Sterndent Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 782 (1980); Marraccini v. Bertelsman Music Group, ___ A.D.2d ___, 644 N.Y.S.2d 875 (3rd Dept. 1996).
While ideas that reflect genuine novelty and invention have protection, ideas which are not novel are in the public arena and may be freely used by anyone, see Oasis Music, Inc. v. 900 U.S.A., Inc., 161 Misc.2d 627 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Cty 1994). The comedic confusion arising from different languages and the misperceptions that can arise has been elaborated over the centuries of theater, see e.g. Shakespeare, Henry V (involving the language barrier between the English King Henry and the French Princess Katherine). In this case, the comedic elements of conversations in different languages with the setting of a Korean nail salon are not so genuinely novel and original as to warrant protection. The elaboration in this case of a language confusions sketch of a Korean nail salon does not justify a different result. There are numerous differences between the two sketches and to the extent there is similarity, it is on such a general level that no protection is warranted.
Additionally, the publication of plaintiff's film at a film festival, in screenings and at a short commercial run in Los Angeles indicate that the work cannot be considered confidential in any sense, see Ashland Management, Inc. v. Janien, 82 N.Y.2d 395 (1993); Surplus Equipment, Inc. v. Xerox Corp., 120 A.D.2d 582 (2nd Dept. 1986). Even assuming plaintiff had initially imparted his idea to defendant Carol Leifer with confidentiality, his subsequent actions made the idea public. In this case. plaintiff only relied on his own subjective understanding but his objective actions both with defendant Carol Leifer at the time of their meeting and subsequently establish that his story idea was not treated confidentially.
Finally to the extent that plaintiffs claims involve the expression of his ideas, this claim is preempted by Federal copyright law, see Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
Defendant Carol Leifer's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted. Since the claims against NBC, Castle Rock and the other defendants are all derivative and dependent upon a determination that defendant Carol Leifer's actions were wrongful, the action against all other defendants is dismissed as well.
This decision constitutes the order of the Court and the clerk shall enter judgment accordingly.
7/2/97 NYLJ 29, (col. 2)
END OF DOCUMENT

Subject: Re: the L word

Written By: marthadtox3 on 06/07/04 at 2:06 am

scenes from a marriage.....guess the decade of this unsuccessful divorce petition.....




Plaintiff testified that defendant found fault with her cooking and with her housekeeping generally. She admitted that she didn't like housework and in our view the criticism of her cooking was also justified
She had a talent for music and some training as a pianist.

Defendant had provided her with a Steinway piano which she later sold, and not long before the final separation he bought her a Hammond organ at a cost of $2,750. He said he bought it and gave it to her to alleviate her discontent and to contribute to her happiness. In spite of that, she admitted calling him 'cheap, parsimonious, mean, niggardly' on at least one occasion


The second incident occurred at an informal party at the home of 'the Millers', who were acquaintances but not intimate friends of the Seerys. It was a small gathering principally of neighbors. A buffet lunch was set out and drinks were available on self-service without limitation. Three men appeared, stag, at the party. One of them was referred to as Butch; the others are nameless in this record. The three were referred to by a Mrs. Wunning, a neighbor of the Millers, as 'rough strangers'. One of the defendant's witnesses in describing them said they 'weren't particularly educated' but she 'couldn't say they were foulmouthed'. *328

There is evidence of one witness that one of these 'characters' was monopolizing Mrs. Seery and that he manhandled her without remonstrance from her while dancing with her. Both the plaintiff and Mrs. Wunning said that she submitted to his kisses. Provoked by this conduct (as we, in agreement with the master and the lower court have found) the defendant, about 1 a. m. threw the contents of a highball glass in her face. One of her witnesses said: 'We decided to put her to bed.' While in bed the defendant slapped her on both sides of her face. He said she was drunk and that he was trying to bring her to, so that he could take her home.


She referred to arguments 'all the time we were together' and testified that 'he upset me continually'. She said she had to have medical treatment for her nerves while she lived with him but elsewhere in her testimony she admitted that she had received sedatives regularly, on prescription, three or four times a month continually for the last 12 years. That period included the 6 years that she lived apart from him. Defendant was a good provider; he drank occasionally but only moderately, and never was interested in other women. He worked hard in his business. He admitted that he was temperamental and at times irritable when he came home tired after a hard day's work, and particularly so after the tax lien had been entered against the home at a time when the problem of paying off the lien seemed insurmountable.

She too admitted that she was somewhat to blame and that she was 'not without fault in her dealings with her husband.' She attributed the failure of their marriage to 'incompatibility' because of clashes in temperament. That is as valid an appraisal as any.

In any view, this, in a number of respects, was an unhappy marriage but that does not supply grounds for its dissolution.

The fact that husband and wife do not get along does not warrant a decree of divorce. DeFrancesco v. DeFrancesco, 179 Pa.Super. 106, 115 A.2d 411.

There is no evidence in this case from which an inference of settled hate and estrangement on the part of the defendant may be inferred. Cf. Monaco v. Monaco, 160 Pa.Super. 177, 50 A.2d 520. On the contrary all of the proofs on both sides are to the effect that throughout the last separation the defendant repeatedly, by telephone and by written messages, has asked his wife to return to him. She admits his sincerity in these requests.

The record in its entirety in this case utterly fails to support the charge of cruel and barbarous *330 treatment and clearly does not supply proof of a course of conduct of the husband which rendered the wife's condition (even assuming her to be an innocent party) intolerable and her life burdensome. A divorce in this case was properly refused.


Plaintiff before the last separation moved the Hammond organ which her husband had given her, to a funeral home where she was employed as an organist

Subject: Re: the L word

Written By: marthadtox3 on 06/07/04 at 2:09 am

It's OK to have long hair ..... so long as you bother to wash it........

In September, 1969, Jerald Gere, a transfer student from New York, enrolled in the tenth-grade class. At the start of the 1969-1970 school year, the students were orally advised at a general assembly, and the parents through a newsletter from the Principal, that certain rules had been adopted pertaining to student dress, including the following:

'Hair length will be determined to a large extent by how well it is kept and groomed. When the hair becomes so long that it can't meet these conditions then a haircut is in order. No beards or mustaches are allowed. Sideburns may be worn even with the ears.'

In November, 1969, a committee of girls from the Student Council requested the Principal to revise the Dress Code in order to allow the wearing of culottes and, after submitting the matter to the faculty, approval was granted. In February, 1970, the Student Council asked for a modification of the rule concerning blue jeans and subsequently the modification was adopted pursuant to a faculty recommendation.

In the meantime, numerous complaints were made to the Principal about the hair style and appearance of Jerald Gere, who, at this point, had allowed his hair to grow to shoulder length and was attempting to grow a goatee. For example, (a) a student complained that because of Jerald's poor eyesight, he leaned forward while eating to the degree that his hair would hang in his plate and he would then throw his hair back out of the plate, causing annoyance to others in the cafeteria; (b) another student refused to sit next to Jerald in class charging that his hair was dirty and 'she couldn't tell what was going to crawl out of it', and (c) others accused him of causing annoyance by combing out the long strands of his goatee while in class.

A delegation from the American Legion called on the Principal protesting Jerald's refusal to abiJerald reappeared for the 1970-1971 school year with tresses touching his shoulders, which style, he concedes, violates the new Dress Code. Once again he was asked to comply and again he refused. Suspension followed and this lawsuit was commenced.de by the Code and parents of students warned that '* * * we'll send our sons to cut his hair.'

Fortunately, the school year ended in June without further incident. During the summer, a new written Dress Code was drafted by the Administrative Staff and approved by the Faculty on August 31, 1970. The Code was then submitted to the Student Council, consisting of thirty representatives, and was approved with but one dissent after a change concerning the wearing of sandals without stockings in warm weather was agreed upon. The Code was accepted by vote of the School Board on September 8, 1970, to go into effect at the start of school on September 14, 1970. With reference to hair adornment, the Code provided:

'Hair length will be determined to a large extent by how well it is kept and groomed. Hair will not be allowed to be worn if the length touches or goes past the shirt collar of a regular man's dress shirt, nor will it be allowed when it grown over the ear or ears, nor if it is longer on the forehead than the line established by the eyebrows. When the hair becomes so long that it does not meet all of these conditions, a haircut will be in order. Beards and mustaches of any type are not allowed. Sideburns may be worn *855 but no longer than the bottom of the ear lobe."

I feel the issue of hair length is receiving much more attention and creating more problems than it deserves. One need merely look around him to realize that the younger generation likes a longer hair style and, in time, today's extremes may become *856 the order of the day. But there are far more serious problems in education, as well as out, that warrant our energies and efforts than a debate over the aesthetics and interpretations of hair style. To many of us hair style ceased to be a problem years ago, and while its discussion revives wistful memories, its significance becomes less important

the Court's duty is to determine the constitutionality of hair regulation and not the wisdom of it.

Therefore, I find (a) that plaintiff's hair style does not constitute free speech within the protection of the First Amendment or a fundamental right under the Ninth Amendment, but is a personal liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment; (b) that a student's liberty in a high school environment may be regulated if such regulation is reasonable and necessary to alleviate interference with the educational process; (c) that the hair length limitation in the Blue Ridge Dress Code was proposed in a bona fide attempt to preserve order, to maintain a balance between individual students' rights and the rights of the whole, and to assist the Faculty in the fulfillment of the teaching function; (d) that the regulation was not an attempt by the Principal to impose his personal taste on the student population, but represented a consensus of Administrative, Faculty, Student and School Board opinions, and (e) that under the circumstances of this case, the hair style regulation was reasonable and necessary to alleviate interference with the educational process at Blue Ridge High School.
Plaintiff's complaint will be dismissed.

Subject: Re: the L word

Written By: marthadtox3 on 06/12/04 at 7:59 am

beware of unedited thoughts


The defendants make much--too much--of the fact that in 1978, two years before the event in issue, Pheterson had brought a personal-injury suit, later dismissed, in which he claimed to have suffered brain damage as a result of being exposed to dry-ice fumes (i.e., carbon dioxide); of his subsequent statements that the carbon-dioxide poisoning had caused an impairment of his memory; and of a letter that Pheterson wrote to an assistant United States attorney in which he discussed the conflict between his "oversoul" and his "undersoul." In fact there is no indication that Pheterson had suffered significant brain damage caused by dry-ice fumes or anything else (he was conducting business as usual two years after bringing that suit), or that he had any mental illness, though he admitted that he had a problem remembering things--a type of problem too common, however, to be suggestive of a mental disease or defect that psychiatry might elucidate. The letter in question is rambling, weird, but not demented. The reference to a conflict between the "oversoul" and the "undersoul"--between what Freudian psychologists call the superego and the id, and what laymen a generation ago called one's "good angel" and one's "bad angel"--is not evidence of mental illness. The letter was a rough draft that Pheterson was reluctant to turn over to the assistant United States attorney; and many rough drafts, like the unedited thoughts that run through people's minds, are pretty strange

Subject: Re: the L word

Written By: marthadtox3 on 06/12/04 at 8:00 am

The facts of this case resemble a bad spy novel. David Taketa was the Special Agent in charge of the DEA office at McCarran International Airport in Las Vegas, Nevada. He shared the office with Thomas O'Brien, an NBI officer assigned to the DEA airport office for the purpose of joint federal-state investigations, but not working directly for the DEA. Another DEA agent, Leroy Kenneth Hartung, also worked at the airport office.
On April 3, 1986, DEA Agent Beth Walther Latheberry reported to Joseph Catale, the Resident Agent in Charge of DEA operations in Las Vegas, that Taketa had shown her how to modify a pen register to intercept telephone conversations illegally. Catale initiated an investigation. DEA Special Agent Peter MacVean from the Los Angeles technical operations group was sent to assist.
FN1. A pen register is a device that records the numbers dialed from a monitored telephone. Its use is not constrained by the fourth amendment. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 2582-83, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979). However, during the period in question it was DEA policy to obtain judicial authorization prior to using a pen register. See United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U.S. 159, 168-69, 98 S.Ct. 364, 370-71, 54 L.Ed.2d 376 (1977). Pen register authorization does not allow the tapping of the targeted telephone to
intercept the contents of calls, because wiretaps are limited by the special requirements of Title III, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (Supp. IV 1986).


The airport office consisted of a large office with two smaller offices attached. Hartung used the larger general office, while Taketa and O'Brien each used one of the smaller private offices. Although the airport office was under Catale's authority, its operations tended to be independent from those of the downtown office.
On the night of April 24, 1986, Catale and MacVean entered the airport office by means of a master key Catale had obtained from Hartung. The doors to the inner offices were open. Catale and MacVean examined the airport office to determine the feasibility of installing video surveillance equipment the next time the office was authorized to operate a pen register.
In May 1986, the airport office received authority to use a pen register in an investigation of one Eugenio Rodriguez. On the night of May 15, 1986, Catale, MacVean, and another agent reentered the airport office. They did not see the pen register in *669 the large general office or in Taketa's office. The agents determined that the pen register was operating in O'Brien's office because that was where the phone lines terminated. O'Brien's door was locked, and the agents did not have a key. They forced the lock with a plastic card and entered O'Brien's office. Inside, they found a pen register in operation. A cable ran from the pen register to a briefcase. The agents opened the briefcase. Inside it they found a Bell & Howell "intelligence kit" used for covert audio surveillance. The intelligence kit was recording telephone calls picked up by the pen register; in fact, a call was recorded while the agents were in O'Brien's office.
The agents removed and copied the audio tape found in the intelligence kit and then inserted a duplicate tape in place of the original. They took photographs of the scene, and installed a hidden video camera in the ceiling of the office. The video camera photographed only the area of the office in which the pen register and intelligence kit were located; it did not have audio capability. On May 16, MacVean obtained a search warrant for the airport office based on what he had learned during his covert entry. Between May 16 and May 19, MacVean entered the airport office twice more at night to replace tapes in the surveillance camera. The doors to the inner offices were open on both occasions. On May 19, 1986, DEA agents executed the search warrant, seizing numerous personal and business items from Taketa and O'Brien.
The appellants were indicted on several counts of illegal interception of wire communications, conspiracy to intercept such communications, and use of intercepted communications, all in violation of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20.

Subject: Re: the L word

Written By: marthadtox2 on 06/16/04 at 8:37 am

A strange story .... could it be true?????


The transactions that preceded the indictment in this case are unusual, if not bizarre. Most of the evidence was undisputed.
The prosecution presented evidence that Schlei, and others attempted to sell certain financial instruments in the United States. Schlei and his salespersons represented that these financial instruments had been issued by the government of Japan or the Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank. The instruments were labeled "Certificates of Balance of Redemption, Series 57" (the "bond certificates"), with face amounts ranging from ten billion yen to 500 billion yen, and cashier's checks allegedly issued by the Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank (the "bank notes"), each drawn for fifty billion yen. The bond certificates were purportedly issued by the government of Japan in exchange for money or property received from the bond certificate holders or payees.
The prosecution's theory at trial was that Schlei had actual knowledge, or deliberately closed his eyes, to the fact that these financial instruments were worthless because they were not issued by the government of Japan or the Dai- Ichi Kangyo Bank. Schlei testified that he believed that the instruments were valid but that corrupt officials of the government of Japan had falsely claimed that they were not genuine. The jury was persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the bond certificates and bank notes were not genuine and that Schlei had the requisite criminal intent to defraud when he represented to prospective purchasers that these instruments were valid.

I
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
A. Background
Schlei argues that the judgment must be reversed because the Government failed to present evidence that he intended to defraud anyone in attempting to sell the bond certificates and the bank notes. He asserts that the record shows that he informed each prospective buyer that the government of Japan claimed that these financial instruments were not valid. He also maintains that fraud has not been demonstrated because no reasonable person would have purchased these instruments without receiving confirmation of their validity from the Japanese government, in view of their extraordinary face value and the disclosures made to prospective purchasers. In addition, Schlei contends that the evidence is also insufficient to demonstrate that he directly or indirectly participated in the sale of a bond certificate to undercover officers in Tampa, Florida.


FN2. According to the parties, the United States currency equivalent for the bond certificates ranged from one hundred million dollars for a ten billion yen bond certificate, to five billion dollars for a five hundred billion yen bond certificate. The fifty billion yen bank notes were equivalent to five hundred million dollars.


  In discussing whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the judgment of conviction against Schlei, we are required to review the facts produced at trial by the parties in the light most favorable to the Government. United States v. Calhoon, 97 F.3d 518, 523-24 (11th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 806, 118 S.Ct. 44, 139 L.Ed.2d 11 (1997). In reviewing a sufficiency claim, we "accept all reasonable inferences and credibility choices made in the government's favor, *953 to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 523. "We also review de novo whether there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions." Id.
1. The Source of the Financial Instruments
In the early part of 1985, Sam M. Han, a Korean-American, met with C.K. Lee, a fellow Korean-American, and T. Hiraki, a Japanese national, in Los Angeles, California. Lee and Hiraki told Han that they represented certain persons who wanted Han's assistance in getting the government of Japan to acknowledge the validity of the bond certificates and bank notes. Han was told by Hiraki and Lee that the government of Japan claimed that the financial instruments were not genuine and had refused to honor them. Han urged Lee and Hiraki to seek legal advice.
In March of 1985, Han and Lee met with Schlei at his law office in Los Angeles to discuss negotiation of the financial instruments. Han and Lee informed Schlei that the government of Japan would not negotiate with them without pressure from outside of Japan. Sometime shortly thereafter, Schlei met with Han and Lee, as well as a group of Japanese nationals, including Toshio Takahashi. Schlei, Han, and Takahashi later traveled to Japan and interviewed persons who possessed some of the bond certificates and bank notes. The holders of these instruments informed Schlei and Han that they received them from a woman named Hatsu Aoyagi.
On April 8, 1985, Schlei and Han met with Stanley Sporkin, the general counsel for the Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA"). At this meeting, Schlei told Sporkin that he had been informed by a group of Japanese citizens that a secret, two billion dollar fund had been accumulated by General Douglas MacArthur during the American occupation of Japan. Schlei stated the secret fund came from money confiscated from foreigners, the imperial family, and property seized during Japan's occupation of Korea. Schlei's alleged informants referred to it as the Marquat Fund (the "M Fund"). Schlei told Sporkin that the fund was administered by the United States and the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan. Schlei related that he was informed that in 1958, then-Vice President Nixon promised to give Okinawa to Japan and turn control of the M Fund over to Japan in exchange for Japan's support in electing him president of the United States. Schlei told Sporkin that a woman who had been indicted for the forgery of these financial instruments had been acquitted of that charge.
Sporkin testified that Schlei declared that he wanted the CIA to know he was going to try to present these instruments for payment and "wanted to give a heads up to a possible political problem." Sporkin informed Schlei that he knew nothing about the financial instruments or the M Fund, and that the story Schlei had related "seem extraordinary." Sporkin also testified that he thought "it was a crazy idea, preposterous."
Sporkin promised Schlei that he would call him to indicate whether the CIA had any interest in Schlei's plan to attempt to sell the bond certificates and the bank notes. In a subsequent telephone call, Sporkin told Schlei that the CIA had no interest in the proposed sale of the financial instruments because "t was a private matter."
After returning to Los Angeles, Schlei agreed to provide legal representation to Hiraki, Takahashi, Lee, and Han "in relation to the negotiation and cashing of certain checks and other instruments."


FN3. The undated written retainer agreement reads as follows:

Subject: Re: the L word

Written By: Leo Jay on 06/16/04 at 10:14 am

I don't get this thread -- is it in the right place?  Am I missing something?

Subject: Re: the L word

Written By: marthadtox3 on 06/16/04 at 11:32 am

Hi

This thread started out after a discussion on the boards about the process of making an amiright CD and there was a discussion about the legal issues eg copyright etc... that  thread was called the L word( meaning "law")
I carried it on as a law/music humour thread using initially extracts from funny law suits connected to coyright law, music etc ( there are lots of the original cases still there in the archive)  since then I have expanded the scope of it to cover just odd or funny law suits not only law suits about music and musicians...although I still come up with those from time to time...  All the text is taken from the words of a judge in a law suit

The purpose is merely for amusement for those who find such things amusing...  maybe that is only me Philbo and John... but maybe not as it does get a few hits...

Subject: Re: the L word

Written By: marthadtox3 on 06/21/04 at 2:00 am

Speakeasies and coffeeshops    another sideways look at US musical/cultural history... a partial victory for the jazz musicians of New York....

part 1 :  the problem

Plaintiffs are three individuals and a musician's union, who work and thrive within the jazz community of New York City. Warren Chiasson primarily plays the vibraphone; Mark Morganelli plays the trumpet; Carol Cass is a jazz singer; and Local 802 of the American Federation of Musicians is a craft union which has members who play wind, brass and percussion instruments. These plaintiffs have brought a declaratory judgment action to challenge the constitutionality of a New York City Ordinance and **501 a Zoning Resolution which they contend is arbitrary and infringes upon their constitutionally protected right to freedom of expression.
The motion now before me is for mandatory injunctive relief against the enforcement of these provisions (CPLR 6301). Plaintiffs contend that the continued enforcement of these unconstitutional provisions cause them irreparable damage in that they have been unable to play the instruments of their choice at certain clubs. Because of the restriction in the law as to type and number of musical instruments which they can play in unlicensed or non-cabaret establishments these plaintiffs cannot work in small jazz clubs or coffee houses.
The complex regulatory scheme at issue is governed by Article 38 of the Administrative Code of the City of New York. Under this scheme cabarets, public dance halls, and catering establishments must be licensed. (Ad. Code § B32-297.0). A cabaret is defined as any place where entertainment such as music, singing or dancing is offered in connection with the sale of food or drink. (Ad. Code § B32-296.0). However, there is an exemption from this licensing requirement for eating and drinking establishments which provide incidental musical entertainment. Incidental musical entertainment is defined as that which is provided, "either by mechanical devices or by not more than three persons playing piano, organ, accordian or, guitar, or any stringed instrument or by not more than one singer accompanied by himself or by a person playing piano, organ, accordian, guitar, or any stringed instrument" (Ad. Code Section B32-296.0).
A similar distinction is contained in the Zoning Resolutions. In certain local retail districts, under *642 Section 32-15 only, eating or drinking places which provide incidental musical entertainment are permitted. The definition of incidental musical entertainment parallels the definition in the Administrative Code but does not encompass the singer. Section 32-21 of the Zoning Resolution permits eating or drinking places in certain commercial districts without restriction on entertainment or dancing.
The plaintiffs challenge the manner in which the law defines the term "incidental musical entertainment". They contend that this definition is arbitrary and capricious and discriminates against them, because it excludes wind, brass and percussionist instrumentalists and limits the players to three. Therefore, as jazz musicians, the law strenuously impairs their ability to perform in New York, and denies them due process and equal protection of the laws as well as freedom of expression. Simply put, they contend that there is no rational basis for limiting to three the number of musicians who can play in these unlicensed clubs, nor is there a rational basis for permitting only a piano, organ, accordian, guitar or string instrument to play.


Subject: Re: the L word

Written By: marthadtox3 on 06/21/04 at 2:01 am

part 2 the arguments....

The plaintiffs contend that there is no statement of legislative intent which adequately explains this distinction. However, it appears that cabaret licensing was introduced in the City in 1926, as part of an effort to control speakeasies (Recommendation No. 10, Proceedings of Bd. of Alderman and Municipal Assembly of City of New York, December 7, 1926, at p. 577). The report of the Committee on Local Laws stated the purpose of the bill:
"... there has been altogether too much running 'wild' in some of these night clubs and, in the judgment of your committee, the 'wild' stranger and the foolish native should have the check-rein applied a little bit (Ibid.)"
In 1936, the definition of a cabaret was amended to add the exception for mechanically reproduced music and for a player piano. In 1961, the administration of the law was transferred to the Department of Licenses (now under the Department of Consumer Affairs) and a special licensing system for coffee-houses was established. Local Law 95 of March 29, 1961 provided an exception for those "coffee houses" which provided incidental musical entertainment without dancing, either by mechanical devices, or by not more than three persons playing piano, organ, accordian, guitar, or any other string instrument. Thus, only certain coffee-houses had *643 to be licensed, others which provided only incidental musical entertainment did not.
**502 In 1971, the Cabaret Law was changed to its present form and that portion of the exemption for musical entertainment that was contained in the "coffee house law" was incorporated into the exemption under the Cabaret Law. In 1979, Article 39 of the Administrative Code which governed the licensing of coffee houses was repealed. There is no indication why the City Council adopted the definition of incidental musical entertainment which was contained in the coffee house ordinance.
Plaintiffs suggest that there is no expression of the intent of the legislature, either in introducing the limit of three with respect to the number of instruments, or in the choice of instruments. Rather, the selection of instruments seemed to fit the pattern of what was expected in a coffee-house as they were identified with the sound, for example, of folk or ethnic music. It is the contention of the plaintiffs that this loose and arbitrary scheme cannot withstand a constitutional attack.
One explanation which the defendants offer for excluding certain types of instruments and for limiting the number to three is noise control. However, as plaintiffs note, that explanation is unpersuasive for under modern conditions of amplification, music from "mechanical devices" such as stereos and electric guitars is as loud as, if not louder than, music from wired and percussion instruments.
Moreover, as the plaintiffs explain, the noise control justification is severely undercut by the enactment of a recent ordinance. Administrative Code 1403.3-5.2 limits to 45 decibels the volume of sound audible in a building, but outside the room, where amplified music is being played. As stated in the affidavit of the president of the local union, John Glasel, this bill was initially offered as a part of a compromise package to the City Council, in which reform in the definition of "incidental music" was offered, together with a noise-control ordinance. On December 31, 1985 the "Noise Bill" was passed. The other did not. As a result, the amount of noise audible outside an establishment where music is played is limited, regardless of what instruments are played and regardless of whether the band is a trio or a quartet. Therefore plaintiffs claim, there is no constitutional interest which is furthered through limiting the types of instruments which can be played at these unlicensed establishments.
Defendants' opposing papers barely make reference to this *644 particular argument regarding noise control and the enactment of the noise decibel bill. Rather, the defendants assert that the ordinances and zoning resolutions serve a significant and valid public purpose. It is submitted in the affidavit of Julius Spector, Chief Engineer of the Department of City Planning that the zoning provisions are specifically designed to safeguard the noise, crowding and congestion which entertainment establishments frequently produce if these establishments are not restricted in some way.

Subject: Re: the L word

Written By: marthadtox3 on 06/21/04 at 2:01 am

part 3  the judgement.... 


There are essentially two portions of these laws which plaintiffs challenge; that which limits the number of musicians to three, and that which restricts the type of instruments. It is clear that defendants have simply failed to set forth what, if any substantial governmental interest is furthered by refusing to permit percussion, wind, and brass instrumentalists to play in unlicensed clubs. A licensing scheme which ensures that the regulated activity conforms to certain health and safety requirements will be upheld (Merco Properties, Inc. v. Guggenheimer, supra). However, when the ordinance does not rationally relate to state concerns and infringes upon a protected liberty, it should not be sustained. It has already been noted in People v. Walter, 106 Misc.2d 359, 431 N.Y.S.2d 776 Crim.Ct. NY Co., 1980, that mechanical devices today may create more noise than any three piece band. In addition, any problem with noise control has already been adequately addressed by the noise audible law.
For the same reasons, the restriction on the type of instrument which can accompany a singer also fails to further a legitimate state interest.
    However, while the City has failed to persuasively articulate what interest it has in restricting the type of instrument to largely stringed instruments, it has advanced a legitimate reason for limiting the number of instruments

Subject: Re: the L word

Written By: marthadtox3 on 06/27/04 at 3:05 pm

another judge who cannot reisst the temptation to burst into song

par*1 Defendant Marshall Bruce Mathers, III, a/k/a Eminem Slim Shady (hereinafter referred to as "Defendant") has filed a motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). Plaintiff requests the Court deny Defendant's motion.
Defendant is a successful hip-hop/rap music artist who attended Dort Elementary School in Roseville Michigan, Macomb County. Plaintiff also attended Dort Elementary School during the same time period. This lawsuit arises out of the lyrics contained in Defendant's 1999 song entitled "Brain Damage", released on the "Slim Shady LP", and statements attributed to Defendant during an interview regarding the Brain Damage song published in Rolling Stone Magazine. The lyrics of Brain D